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Chapter I 
Dn'RODUCTION 
Government Charges 
In September of 1949, The Great Atlantic and Pacific 
Tea Compaey was charged with being a monopoly and restraining 
trade. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
filed a civil action complaint against the chain for their-
illegal conduct and asked that forceful measures be taken to 
see that The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Compaqy (to be 
known as A&P) be prevented from ever being able to repeat 
their illegal operations. If the government is successfUl 
in its prosecuti on, it may mark a new trend in the interpret-
ation of Antitrust legislation, cause many changes in retail-
ing practices, and _possibly hav~ an effect on the ultimate 
consumer of food _ products. 
The complaint was filed under the first two sect-
ions of the Sherman Antitrust Law of 1890. (1) The Justice 
Department has accused A&P of attempting to restrain and 
monopolize a substantial portion of interstate trade and 
commerce in the food marketing field. It was stated that the 
chain received discriminatory price preferences by threats 
and that through the use of these preferences, A&P was able 
to undersell its competitors. The government believes that 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co., Complaint in U.S.District Ct. of 
N.Y.,civil Action No.52-139 
the only way to stop these practices is to break A&P into 
completely separated units of selling and manufacturing. 
This has been done with other large integrated firms in the 
past and worked successfully; they feel that it ~~11 work 
again. 
Important Questions in the case 
There are three important questions to be considered 
in a discussion of the present case: First, what is the extent 
of A&P's guilt? Secondly, is it necessar,y that the present 
A&P organization be dissolved, or is it possible for the comp-
any to operate without violating the law? FinallY, if the 
Justice Department should win its case, what will the effect 
of the decision be on those who are directly or indirectly 
concerned . with food . dis.t .ribution? 
Significance of These Questions 
The Justice Department contends that the retail 
stores of .A&.P can go right on operating as they are now, but 
it is not easy to diss~lve such a tremendous business. It 
would seem that some disturbance might be caused that would 
have an effect on producers, middlemen, retailers, and con-
sumers. The MP stores may not be able to continue on the 
same basis of low price levels and excellent standards of 
efficiency. Will it mean that the independent competitor will 
be able to compete on a more equal basis and perhaps gain 
back lost trade? 
5 
Other lar,ge chains such as Safew~, Kroger, sears 
and Roebuck, and Woolworths m~ possibly find that they will 
also be open to similar action under the decision. Once the 
precedent has been established, it will be easier for the 
Department of Justice to interpret violations of the law as 
indicative of a monopoly, even though these violations are 
not too serious a breach of law. 
Assistant Attorney General Herbert A Bergson has , 
stated that the Department of Justice believes that once 
A&P can be stopped from receiving discriminator,y prices, that 
the whole level of general food prices will go down. (l) 
He feels that since A&P's practices are causing the food 
suppliers to char.ge higher prices to, other customers7 they 
will reduce prices once the power of A&P has been broken. 
However, taking an opposite viewpoint, it is possible that 
the suppliers may see no reason for lowering their prices 
once the pressure has been removed since it is to their 
·. 
interest to get the highest price possible for their goods. 
It may also mean a drop in volume to some of the larger 
suppliers. 
The consumer should have a deep interest in the 
results of the . trial. . The government may not be acting in 
(l)Statement to the New York Times, Dec.ll,l949 
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the best int erests of the public when it wants to break up 
a low price food chain that has served the consumers well 
for a great many years. The housewife may find that the 
cost of food has changed and both sides are making· claims as 
to the direction it will go. 
Approach to the cas~ 
Many articles have been written on the case, most 
of them on the side of A&P. These articles are usually in the 
form of editorials condemning the government action and 
claiming that it is a trial against bigness alone. The 
majority of these papers probably carry A&P advertising so 
that there is undoubtedly a great deal of bias in their 
reasoning. M:.P has also i ssued a great variety of literature 
and posters presenting its side of the case . These posters 
have been appearing in both their stores and in the news-
papers all over the country that carry A&P advertising. The 
J·ustice Department and certain congressmen have also been 
active in making speeches and releasing information defending 
the government 's action. ~1) Both sides have presented 
convincing arguments, but the final decision can only be 
made in the courts . A carefUl examination of the case may 
make it possible to arrive at conclusions which would be of 
(1) J .Howard McGrath, "Bigness Itself Is No Crime" ,u. S.News 
Nov.25,49 ,p.26-30 ; Rep.Wright Pa~,Congressional Record, 
Oct.3 & 6,1949 
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interest to the marketing student since many marketing prob-
lems and 'practices involved in the buying, manufacturing, and 
selling of retail goods are contained in the actions of A&P. 
First, a study will be made of the history of the 
company, with attention paid to those events that are concern-
ed in the present case. This will include a review of the 
events leading directly up to the present charges, as well as 
a summa.cy- of the organization of the company. Tl:le buying and 
selling activities of the company, including the methods of 
operation and the charges pertaining to them, will be discussed 
under separate headings. The final chapter will present 
conclusions and the probable effects of the case. It will 
be the object of this paper to show that .A&P is not a true 
monopoly even though ·the company has violated the law. 
Chapter II 
THE GROWTH OF A&P 
Organization of the CompS!lY 
MP has become one of the largest retail chains in 
the country with sales of over two and one-half' billion 
dollars in 1948. John A. Hartford,president, and George 
Hartford, chairman of the board, preside over this tremendous 
organization and act as trustees for the estate left by their 
father, George H. Hartford, who was responsible for the 
growth of A&P. Ninety-nine percent of the authorized and 
issued voting stock of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea co. 
of New York is included in the trust and controlled by the 
brothers. The corporation owns all of the stock of the Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. of America, chartered in Maryland, 
which in turn owns all of the stock of the various Mc.P oper-
ations. 
The retailing functions . of the company are Wlder 
three subsidiaries: The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Companies 
of New Jersey, of Arizona, and of Nevada. The retailing areas 
occupied by A&P are broken down into seven major geographical 
divisions known respectively as the New England, Atlantic, 
Eastern, southern, central, central western, and .Midclle 
western Divisions. These divisions are fUrther divided on 
a territorial basis into units consisting of a central ware-
house and a group of retail stores. In all, there are thirty-
9 
seven of these units located most~ in the eastern half of 
the United States with one division on the west coast. The 
divisions are set up as though they were complete companies 
although they are not incorporated. Control of the operat-
ions is highly centralized under the direction of the Hart-
ford brothers. The central Merchandising Committee issues 
directives to all the divisions and units interpreting the 
plans and objectives of the company while the Divisional 
Presidents hold regular meetings to coordinate the over-all 
merchandising strategy of the . stores. 
1wmufacturing and Buying Subsidiaries 
The lar,gest of A&P's manufacturing subsidiaries is 
the Quaker Maid Co. Inc. which operates three giant plants 
producing hundreds of different types of canned goods, food 
products and other common grocery store articles. Two huge 
laundries and a printing plant are also in this company. 
In addition, A&P operates a huge bakery, The Wbite House 
Milk Corp. , and the Nakat Packing Corp. which not only packs 
saunon but operates fleets of fishing boats in Alaska. The 
National Fish Dept. is associated with this company and does 
a tremendous volume in the purchasing of fish. In addition 
to .this, A/!J:j) publishes a weekly ~azine known as Woman's Day 
which enjoys a ver.y large circulation. 
several lar.ge buying subsidiaries supply the chain 
lO 
with other foods and food products. These include the National 
Meat Dept., The National Butter Dept., Tbe National Egg and 
Poultry Dept., The .American Coffee Dept., and a special tea 
· buying office. The Great American Tea Co., the origional 
company founded by George Gilman, is still in operation on 
a ver,y limited scale. The largest buying subsidiary is the 
Atlantic Commission Co. (to be known as Acco) and it is consid-
ered one of the biggest offenders in the present government 
. suit. Acco buys fruits and vegetables for both the retailing 
and manufacturing subsidiaries of MP, seventy-five percent 
of which goes to the compaqy and the other twenty-five percent 
is sold to outlets allegedly in competition with A&P. (1) 
The operations of the fifty buying offices of Acco are controll -
ed directly from the New York headquarters by a system of Tele-
type so that immediate action can be taken in any part of the 
country to purcha.se the best produce. at the lowest. prices. 
Early Historx 
In the middle 1850's, George F. Gilman was a dealer 
in hides and leather in New York City. Evidently in an at tempt 
to gain added business, Gilman decided to take on tea as a side-
line in 1859. It was at a time when grocers placed a high 
markup on tea to offset low margins on more competitive items, 
but Gilman bo.ught up large. shipments from the New York Docks 
\l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed. Supp.626 
ll 
and resold the tea to the consumers in his store at a much 
lower price than that usually set by the grocers. The new 
line went so well that Gilman dropped the hides and leather 
and opened new stores under the name of the Great American 
Tea .co.. (l) 
Gilman used a great deal of advertising both in the 
newspapers and on handbills to show that his prices· were low 
because he had eliminated the middleman. The company soon 
expanded into a small chain of stores, but competition also 
grew and many of them capitalized on the same name that Gilman 
had chosen. To overoome this difficulty, it was decided to 
change the name to the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea company, 
in 1869. George Hartford, future owner of the company, first 
came into prominence in 1873 when he signed a partnership 
agreement with Gilman which gave Hartford management and contz.ol 
of both M.P and the Great American Tea Cornpa.zzy. Gilman retired 
at this time and died in 1901, without leaving a will. There 
were many heirs all clamoring for a share of the business and 
profits, and f'or a time, Hartford was in danger of' losing 
control of the company. However, he managed to solve the prob-
lem by working out a comprimise with the heirs and A&P was 
incorporated in 1902 under the laws of' New Jersey. Hartford 
retained. all of' the cormnon voting. stock for himself and 
(l)Roy J.Bullock,"History of the Great Pt&.P Tea Co.",~~ 
~iness Review, Vol.XI: Apr.l933,pp.289-298 
and divided up the preferred stock among the Gilman c~aimants. 
After bui~ding up a successf~ food chain, Hartford died in 
~9~7 and left the company to his two sons to be administered 
in trust. 
Expansion of P&P 
The MP stores carried only tea unti~ about ~890 
when they started adding a few regu~ar food lines unti~ they 
became conventional grocer,y stores. They carried no meat or 
produce and offered their customers regular delivery service 
and credit. The first major change took place in ~9~3 when 
Hartford introduced the famous Economy Store. The new stores 
were run on a cash and carry basis by one or two men, and 
carried small inventories at as low a price as possib~e while 
they worked for a h~h turnover. A&P sought to get as complete 
coverage as possible in all the areas in which it operated 
and opened up several hundred new stores. A number of stores 
were also pushed into new territories and a peak figure was 
reached of 15,700 outlets in 1930. (1) A new trend ~ater 
caused this figure to drop back to about 5000 in 1948, but 
in the same year, A&P did about two and one-half bil~ion 
dollars in sales and had almost seven percent of the total 
volume of the grocery business in the country. 
During the . years that M.P was expanding its retail 
(~) 11 The Great Jl&Pli , Fortune Iviagazine, Nov.l947 ,p.258 
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operations, it was also building up the giant manufacturing 
and buying subsidiaries that were to supply the retail stores. 
Today, many of them rank among the largest in the co W1try. 
ln 1925, A&P began to overhaul its basic policies and practices. 
John Hartford sounded the keynote when he said that he was a 
firm believer in getting the business into a position whereby 
they could sell.goods cheaper than any other concern in the 
country. (l) Acco was also established at this time to 
purchase all the company's perishables; today, it supplies 
about seventy-five percent of the needs of the retail stores. 
As a part of this new policy, MP began to replace 
t he Econo~ Stores with a new type of outlet know as the 
combination store. (2) These were lar,ge general food markets 
carrying not only groceries, but produce and meat as well . 
By 1929, there were three thousand of these specializing in 
low price merchandise. Other large chains began doing the 
same thing and the independent stores carrying only groceries 
found the competition becoming increasingly stro~. Many 
of these were forced to close and the trend was greatly increas-
ed during the depression years of 1929 to 1935. The 
neighborhood independent, carrying an incomplete line at 
high prices and using antiquated merchandising methods, was 
squeezed out. 
(1) Fortune Magazine, "The Great .A&P" ,Nov .1947 ,p.249 
(2 , "A&P From A to Z",Business week,Nov.30,1932,p.9 
It was only a step to convert from the combination 
stores into the supermarKets. Although A&P was late in 
adopting the idea, it started to close up many of the smaller 
groceries and concentrate on the large stores which offered 
greater returns :from mass merchandising. By 1947 , nearly 
ten thousand stores had been closed with most of the effort 
now being put into hug~ self-service stores drawing on a lar.ge 
marketing area. 
Opposition to MP 
.Po.:P has met with opposition and critic ism ever since 
it was founded. As early as 1870, The American G1·ocers JiA:aga-
zine, representing the independents, criticized the practices 
of the Great American Tea co. when they were lowering t he price 
of tea at a time when most independents wanted to keep the 
price high to compensate for lower prices on stapl es. The 
magazine also pointed out that the growing chain was a threat 
and a menace to independent business. (1) 
Resentment continued to grow against A&P and other 
chains, reaching its peak in the 1930's. In June of 1932, The 
.f . 
National Association of Retail Grocers passed a resolution to 
appropriate money in a fight to prove that A&P was monopolistic. 
( 2) They planned a campaign to gather evidence to submi.t ·. to 
(l)Roy Bullock,"History of Great .A&P Coi.n,Harvard Business Rev. 
Vol.XI:Apr.l933 7p.293 (2)"Grocers Call .P&.P a Monopoly",Business week,June 22 71932 7p.8 
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the government and they promised to back up this evidence with 
all out cooperation. This was at a time when the large comb-
ination stores were coming into prominence and the independent 
was being forced out of business . I t was also a period of 
depression when any inefficient, high price outlet was find-
ing it difficult to continue operations . 
Another attack came in the form of chain store taxes 
and anti-chain legi slation. In 1932, St . Louis tried to levy 
a tax against all chains operating in the city. Other cities 
and states joined in unt il , by 1935, over two hundred chain 
tax bills were introduced in forty-three states. In 1938, 
Representative Wright Patman introduced a bill in Congress 
to lirrd. t the number of c min stores through a discriminatory 
tax and other regulations . .A&P replied with a strong state-
ment of policy that they released to all the newspapers , and 
in addition presented their case to the public in advertise-
ments and other public relation media . Carl Byoir, now in 
charge of the present A&.P appeal to the public , wa.s placed 
in charge of the campaign. 
Representative Patman made a tour of the country 
making speeches in favor of his bill and in general denounc ing 
all lar,ge chains . In one , he ridiculed A&P's statement that 
they might be forced to dissolve if the bill was passed. He 
attacked the l arge size of A&F and said that it was wrong for 
the tremendous profits to go to a pair of childless brothers. 
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This speech was made before the National Association o:f 
Retail Druggists. (1) Shortly after this, it was alleged 
that the expenses :for his tour were paid by F. onald Coster, 
President o:f McKesson and Robbins, a large drug wholesaling 
:firm. ( 2) 
During this period, M:P hinted that if the Patman 
Bill and other discriminatory state taxes went throQgh, the 
company would turn most o:f their stores into voluntar,y,non-
taxable chains. Each store was to be given to its manager 
on a lease or agency basis and .M:.P -vvould handle. all the who.le-
saling functions. An alternative plan was to sell the stores 
outright and A&P would restrict itself to wholesaling and 
manufacturing. Since it had already demonstrated its growing 
efficiency in these fields, competing wholesalers and manufact-
urers were quite disturbed at the prospect of having A&P 
take over their customers as well as servicing the former 
A&P retail outlets. Individual court actions in various states 
held most forms of anti-chain legislation to a minimum. In 
1940, as a result of Congressional hearings and adverse public 
sentiment towards the activities of Representative Patman, 
the bill he had written died in committee. But the anti-chain 
forces were ready for the next round and the pressure was not 
let up. 
(l)Speech before the National Assc. of Retail Druggists, Vital 
Speeches, Vol.5: Nov.l5,1938,pp.69-72 
(2)Business Week,Dec.24,1938 
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Events Leading Up To The Present Case 
In 1941, the Department of Justice started an 
investigation of the food industry to see if there were any 
practices or factors that would tend to raise prices to the 
public. This was a logical move since we were supp~ing 
countries at war in an increasing volume which meant that 
there were opportunities for profiteering. A&P was one of 
those who turned their records over to the gover.nment with 
the understanding that if anything inconsistant was f ound, 
the company woul.d be given an opportunity to remedy it. 
Two years later, after the government had spent a 
considerable length of time in investigating and copyiog the 
records, it was rumored that A&P was to be indicted in Kansas 
City, Missouri. But instead, a special grand jury was con-
vened in Dallas, Texas and an indictment returned against 
A&P on November 25,1942. The chain filed a demurrer and 
Judge William Atwell of the Federal District Court ordered 
the indictment thrown out because it contained inflammatory 
statements. 
The Department o:f Justice then appealed to the 
U.S.Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, New Orleons, 
Louisiana. In a two to one opinion, the case was returned 
to the Dallas Federal court for a hearing on July 30,1943. 
The higher court said that it agreed with Judge Atwell that 
there were many allegations that were inflammatory and 
J.8 
seemed irrelevant. But they stated that the indictment 
could be retained if certain portions were stricken out •. 
On Februar,y 26,1944, a statement was issued by the govern-
ment that a nolle prosgui had. been filed to the Dallas char.ges. 
During this same period, the Department of Justice 
brought two other charges against M.P. In 1942, the :first 
trial was held under Judge Alan T. Goldsborough in washington, 
D.C. and MP was charged with b~ing:_in on __ ~ co;nspira~if to~ ~i:x 
the p~ice of b~ead. in that ~a. Th~ second was · brought up 
in the court o~ Federal Judge c.c. Wyche in Wilson,North 
Carolina in 1943. This: time, M:.P was accused of tr~ ing to 
fix and depress prices being paid to :farmers :for potatoes. 
The chain was aquitted of both charges. 
The government then announced that they had :filed 
a criminal information against A&P in the United States District 
Court of the eastern District of Illinois at Danville. Filing 
an information meant that they could avoid the :formality of 
an indictment and in this wqy, they were able to- make substant-
ially the same charges against MP that they had made in Dallas. 
The case was tried before Federal J·udge Walter C. Lindley, and 
.A&E was found guilty on september 21,1946 of violating sections 
1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Law. (1) At the same time, 
the two next largest retail food chains were also charged with 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed. Supp.626 
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approximately the same violations of the law. The Kroger 
Grocery and Baking Company and Saf'eway Stores both entered 
pleas of nolo contendere, and paid fines respectively of 
¢20,000 and $40,000~ 
A&P decided to appeal the decision and the case 
went to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago. 
When the presiding judge, Sherman Minton, handed down a 
decision against A&P, the company decided not to carry their 
appeal any further and paid a fine of $175,000 on February 
24, 1949' •· ( l) 
But the Department of Justice did not feel that 
this conviction was enough, and it was their contention that 
A&P would go right on with the practices. Therefore, they 
filed a civil action complaint against k~P in the United 
States District Court for the southern District of New York 
on September 15 71949. (2) This is the present case which 
will be discussed. The government has the privilage of trying 
a company twice under the Sherman Act, first to penalize, 
and then to take action to cause the company to cease and 
desist its practices. The present charges are about the same 
as those filed in the Illinois District Court, but now the 
Justice Department asks that -~P be broken up and its retail-
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,?th Cir.Ct.Appeala,No.9221 
(2)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,Complaint in U.S. Dist.Ct.of N.Y., 
Civil Action No.52-139 
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ing and manufacturing activities be completely separated 
from each other. MP has responded with a nationwide public 
appeal through its stores and t he newspapers. Carl Byoir 
and Business Organization, Inc. are once again in charge of 
t he publicity campaign to enlist the sympathies of the Amer-
ican Public. Countless editorials have appeared in the 
nation's newspapers and a.llnost all of them are taking the 
side of A&P. (1) It is doubtful if many of these editorials 
are objective appraisals of the situation since most of th~ 
carry A&P adVertising. 
The Department of J·ustice has also made its side of 
the case known to the public through a series of speeches ahd 
press releases by Attorney General J. Howard McGrath and his 
assistants. Representative Patman has also been active in 
Congress and has caused several comments on the subject which 
appeared in the Congressional Record to be distributed to the 
public. (2) 
It is expected that the case will come to court 
sometime in the late spring of 1950. Whether A&P is guilty 
or not, the outcome will be of extreme interest to students 
of business and mar~eting as well as those actuallY eng~ed 
in business. 
(1) "What the American Press is Saying About the Suit to Destroy 
A&P",published by the N.Y.Great MP Tea Co.(l950) 
(2)Rep.Wright Patman,Congressional Record, Oct.3 & 6,1949 
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Chapter III 
BUYING OPERATIONS .OF A&P 
Organization 
The Headquarters Purchasing Department of MP 
exercises a strong centralized control over all the activities 
of the various agencies of the giant system. (1) David T. 
Bofinger has headed the headquarters department which buys 
many of the more staple products handled by all the units. 
The work is carried out under the supervision of a staff of 
ten to twelve experts, each specializing in a particular 
group of foods. (2) Under them are seven large field offices 
which also buy various other products for the several units. 
Other large scale buying is handled by the subsidiary firms 
such as the National Meat Dept., the National Egg Dept., and 
the Atlantic C.ommission Company. 
It is also possible for the Divisional Director of 
Purchases and the Unit Buyers under him to buy products which 
are sold only in their division. If a manufacturer wishes to 
sell to more than one division, he must go through the Head-
quarters Dept. or one of the field buying offices. (3) 
Store managers are permit te.d to buy some produce from local 
(l)U.s.v.Great A&.P Tea co. ,7th Cir.Ct~Appeals,No.9221 
(2)U.S.v.Great M.P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.636 
(3)Ibid.,p.636 
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sources, but the buying operations of all these lesser 
purchasers are carefully supervised from headquarters. 
The Purchasing Department buys not only for the 
retailing operations of the company, but also for the manufact-
uring subsidiaries. Care is taken to see that new products 
which might compete with MP 's own lines are not stocked until 
the company first makes an effort to satisf'y the demand with 
their own goods. 
'l'he Department of Justice has made many charges 
against the buying activities of P&P. (1) Parts of the 
buying organization have been named as "the rotten thread of 
the fabric". (2) Each of these charges will be discussed 
separately, but all of them are interrelated. The government 
bases its charges on the over-all effect and claims that in 
total, the violations of the law constitute an attempt to 
monopolize a part of the food trade in interstate commerce. 
All of the charges presented here are taken from the comp-
laint filed in the present civil action in the United States 
District Court for the southern District of New York,No.52-l39. 
The Purchase of Manufactured and 
FrOcessed Foods and Food Products 
The Department of Justice begins its list of specific 
(l)U.s.v.Great k cP Tea co.,u.s.Dist.ct.of N.Y.,Civil Action 
No.52-l39 (2)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.679 
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charges against A&P by stating that under the dual threat to 
withdraw their patronage or to manufacture for themselves, the 
company obtained systematic price preferences over their ret-
ail competitors in the purchase of manufactured and processed 
foods and food products. A&P forced these preferences in 
several ways. It is stated that from the year 1925, the chain 
has used three different methods of buying so as to avoid 
having the cost of brokerage added to the price they paid for 
merchandise. 
Between the period of 1925 to 1936, it is alleged 
that the company compelled suppliers to pay brokerage fees to 
the firm's own employees on the purchases of food and food 
products. .M.P sent buyers out from central headquarters to 
get merchandise as cheaply as possible. The buyers operated 
from their own offices and used their own names. Under this 
system, the suppliers were required to pay them a broker~e 
fee of one to five percent which went directly to A&P head-
quarters. (1) The Robinson-Patman Act made this procedure 
illegal in 1936. 
Then A&P adopted a policy of net buying and received 
a reduction in price from the suppliers for the amount of the 
brokerage fee. (2) The lower price was not treated as the 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,?th Cir.Ct.Appeals,No.922l,p.3 
(2)Ibid. ,p.3 
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resul t of brokerage fees being received, but only as a price 
reduction to comply with the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal 
Trade Commission brought suit against A&P in the Third Circuit 
Court in 1940 and caused a cease and desist order to be issued. 
(1) 
The third method of buying was put into operation 
in 1940. The company went on an all out campaign to line up 
suppl iers who would only sell direct to purchasers and thus 
eliminate the middleman or broker. (2) This would also mean 
that the price would be lower since the manufacturer would 
not have to add in the extra amount for a brokerqge fee. A&P 
stated that they would not give any business to a company 
that sold to anyone through brokers. The chain contended that 
the l ower price they received was justified by the cost saving. 
(3) 
The government argued that this resulted in a two 
price structure. Those who bought direct would be able to 
sell at a lower price than those who were forced to buy 
goods which went through the hands of middlemen. This would 
affect the great majority of independent retailers and small 
buyers and the chains would have an advantage which was not 
(l)TheGreat A&P Tea co.v.F.T.c.,l06 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir.l939) 
(2)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed. Supp.626,p.644-645 (3)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,?th Cir.Ct. Appeals,No.922l,p.4 
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available to the others. (1) 
But it cannot be denied that .A&P had some j usti:fi-
cation in its attempt to secure a lower price from the suppliers. 
A&P was paying the seller the cost price plus the brokerage 
fee, and the seller was able to pocket the fee as pure profit 
since there were no brokers involved other than M.P repres-
entatives. This meant that the supplier was receiving a 
greater net price from A&P than he was when be sold to other 
firms through a broker. The present practice of direct buy-
ing is part of a continued attenpt to avoid giving the supp-
lier an unearned brokerage fee. 
But the court does not concern itself with the dis-
criminatory system of two net prices being paid to the supplier, 
but instead states that A&P is receiving an unjustified pref-
erence when it tr.ys to get a lower price. The court adds that 
MP has forced suppliers to fall into the direct selling plan 
and that this is a form of coercion. (2) Without a doubt, 
a large company such as A&P could bring a lot of pressure 
to bear on a supplier, especially if that supplier was accust-
omed to selling most of his output to .P&P. It can also be 
easily seen that if A&P did get the lower price and many of 
the independents didn't, then the independents would be 
(l)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,pp.644-645 
(2)IQ!g.,pp.644-645 
operating at a disadvantage. The direct buying system affects 
two groups, the small retailer and the broker. The consum-
er benefits by the reduced price and the supplier continues 
to receive his usual .net price. 
Su~£±iers' Dual Price Structures 
The Department of Justice next charges that MP 
has coerced suppliers to secretly maintain two price struct-
ures on their food and food products, the lower of which 
would be charged to A&P and the higher charged to competitors 
of A&P. The government has said that the coercion took the 
form of threats to withhold or withdraw purchases and to 
engage in manufacturing competing products on their own 
account. (1) The court then reasons that as a result of 
this coercion, the manufacturers were forced to sell to A&.P 
at a lower price and that they had to make up for this by 
charging higher prices to other buyers, namely coL~etitors 
of PiJ:.P. ( 2) 
A manufacturer who sells a certain volume to small 
buyers must get enough in return for his goods to cover costs. 
If a large buyer such as A&P offers to purchase his product 
in a lar,ge volume, it will mean that he can produce at a lower 
cost. A large part of his production costs are fixed so that 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.639 
{2)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,7th Cir. Ct.Appeals,No.922l,p.3 
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additional volume will lower the costs for each individual 
article. There will be very little selling expense involved 
and hardly any expense related to credit. But, rather than 
allowing him to spread the savings over all his production 
and selling cheaper to everyone, the chains such as MP want 
the savings passed on only to them. The court claims in its 
charge that this is what M.P is doing, and the price reduct-
ion is not proportional to the cost saving, but exceeds it. 
There is a possibility that once the manufacturer 
accepts the large buyer's account, that the lar.ge buyer will 
be able to sell a much greater percentage of the market and 
take away from the trade of the small buyer. This will 
be because of the lower price charged to the large buyer. 
Once business starts to fall off, the producer will want to 
raise his prices to the large buyer, and he will find that he 
cannot without losing the account. The principle of decreas-
ing costs has backfired and the producer finds that he must 
either produce at a loss, get rid of the large buyer, or 
charge higher prices to the small buyer to make up for the 
increasing loss of margin. 
The court gives several examples of A&P using its 
influence to force suppliers into line and sell lower to them. 
Canada Dry report edly stopped selling to MP in 1927 because 
it did not like the retail price A&P was putting on its ginger 
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a.J.e. P&.P started to push its own private brand and in ~928, 
Canada Dry decided that the wisest policy would be to sel~ 
to A&P again rather than lose business. (1) The Ralston 
Purina Company is another case in which .A&P allegedly 
threatened to compete with Ralston by manufacturing its own 
private brand of cereal. (2) 
Undoubtedly, P&.P could present a strong argument 
to its suppliers in favor of conceding lower prices to the 
chain. Just the idea that a b ig customer is going to stop 
buying or compete with a product of his own is enough t o 
make any supplier think twice before refUsing to cooperate, 
but it does not necessarily amount to coercion. A&P tried 
to submit evidence that it was the custom of the trade for . 
retail ers to seek and suppliers to offer the same type of 
concessions given to the company . (3) However, the court 
decided that the evidence was not relevant and excluded it. 
Many of the sellers to A&P were large and included such fir.ms 
as Campbell soups, canada Dry, Procter and Gamble, and the 
Jello company. (4) Their size would have enabled t hem t o 
successfully drop A&P as a customer if they objected to the 
chain's demands. But if they did de cide t o go along with 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.639 
(2)Ibid.,p.640 {3)U.S.v.Great MP Tea Co.,?t h Cir.ct.Appeals,No. 9221,p.l0 
(4)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.639-640 
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A&P, does it follow that they would have to raise their 
prices to other customers? Other large buyers would soon 
know of the di~ferences and demand the same concessions; 
thus, it would cause a general leveling off of price. 
Since these big suppliers can lower their prices, it might 
well be assumed that the prices were too high to begin with 
and that the buyers were forcing it down to a more reasonable 
level. 
The case for the small suppliers is somewhat differ-
ent. Often their entire output will go to a company such as 
A&P. Since the small firm would lose all other contacts, it 
might find itself in a very difficult position should the 
large buyer make demands of any nature, coercive or not. But 
this should be recognized as a nor.mal business risk by a comp-
any before it takes on a large buyer as an account. Further-
more , it would be difficult for a small supplier to char,ge 
higher prices to other buyers to make up for the loss. Once 
it was known that one account received a lower price than 
another, the supplier would have to lower his prices to all 
rather than lose business. He might, therefore, try to keep 
the price levels secret and avoid trouble. 
It can be concluded ,then, that A&P does have the 
power through its large buying activities to sway the actions 
of suppliers in favor of the company. But the fact that it 
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is coercive can be questioned. It is only nor-mal for a large 
chain to want t o buy at low prices and if the compacy feels 
that it can manufacture more cheaply than it can buy, it 
has a right to inform its supplier of this fact. A&P has 
shown through its giant subsidiaries that it can produce 
goods at a lower cost and retain all the profits for itself. 
Secret Preferential Prices and Discounts 
The government continues its preferential price 
charges by stating that A&P has re~ired suppliers to give 
them secret preferential prices and secret preferential 
discounts. It fUrther has alleged that A&P coerced suppliers 
to grant preferential allowances and rebates on various 
pretexts unrelated to any actual savings by or services to 
these suppliers. In 1939, it was pointed out by A&P's own 
lawyers that while A&P had the largest discounts from suppliers 
on the basis of the largest quantities purchased, the term, 
"largest quantities" was misleading. (1) 'l'he company was 
claiming the discounts on the basis that the manufacturer 
would save money by dealing in volume with a large buyer. 
Actually, ..A&P ' s attorneys advised them that, " a large volume 
ordered out in many small shipments rarely involves savings 
in and of itself" . A good example of this was given in .A&P 's 
(l)U. s . v.Great A&P Tea co.,7th Cir.ct.Appeals,No .922l,p.4 
31 
dealings with the Coca Cola Company. (l) Coca Cola was 
delivering its product by truck to the individual branch 
stores and billing each store separately. This was their 
practice with all retailers at the time. In 1941, A&P 
asked that Coca Cola bill the central office direct rather 
than each individual store. The company then asked for a 
quantity di~count which made their purchase price much lower 
than a small chain competitor in the same area. The cost 
of handling and deliver.y was still the same to coca Cola 
so that actually no saving was made with the exception of 
billing. 
After MP received the advice from its lawyers 
that discounts on the basis of large quantities was mislead-
ing, the company developed a policy of getting discounts on 
a basis of cost savings. (2) It is perfectly true that 
the supplier could make some savings in dealing ,with A&P. 
His selling expenses were reduced somewhat and his expenses 
related to the managing of the account, such as credit, 
were also lower. Furthermore, in production, the large 
volume helped to keep doVvn the expense ratio of fixed costs. 
Quite often though, as shown in the Coca Cola case, the 
delivery and handling costs remained high. It was pointed 
out by the .. courts through several examples that MP received 
(l)U. S.v.Great MP Tea Co. ,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.47 
(2)Ibid.,p.48 
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many of its so called cost savings discounts when actually 
the savings were much less than the high discounts given. 
One example was the company ' s dealings with the Quaker oats 
Company . (1) In the last half of 1943, Ouaker Oats sold 
private labelled packaged oats to A&P for $1 . 80 after deduct-
ing ten cents for a label allowance. It sold the same 
product to all others except American stores for $2. 00. 
The controller of the company said that this was done to 
meet competition. At the same time , QUaker Oats was selling 
A&P bulk-rolled oats in bales containing ten 5-pound bags 
while forty-two out of fifty-three other purchasers received 
bales of nine bags the same size . Forty of these were paying 
more than A&P did for ten-bag bales . 
Advertising Allowances 
A&P is alleged to have received part of its pref-
erential allowances by exacting from the suppliers large and 
arbitrarily fixed rebates called advertising allowances in 
return for token advertising performance. The company had 
three types of advertising for.ms . ( 2 ) The first gave flexible 
conditions of compliance and no specific requirements were 
set up . The second included the manufacturer ' s provisions 
for a specific performance, and the third was a regular 
contract in which A&P received no prefer ential treatment. 
(l)U.s.v .Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed. Supp.626 , p . 649 
(2)Ibid. ,p. 651. 
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It was this last type of contract that A~P had with the 
soap companies such as Lever Bros. and Colgate Palmolive-
Feet. The chain attempted to get better terms, but was 
not successful. In a statement of policy in 1939, .Nf:.P 
said that it had no obligations to the soap companies and 
that no more cooperation should be given them than necessary 
in order to qualify for whatever allowances it was felt to 
be good business to earn. Headquarters said that the chain 
was not to pass up any opportunity that would let the 
soap companies know that A&P was dissatisfied with their 
present policy. {1) 
A&P had a regular contract f orm that they sent out 
t o the various companies stating the terms under which the 
chain would receive advertising allowances. The Brillo 
Manufacturing company fil.led one of these out and sent it to 
A&P giving them a ten percent advert ising allowance. It was 
. 
shown in court that Brillo gener ally g ave only a six percent 
allowance and required specific performance for the amount 
paid. (2) The contract with Brillo existed from 1938 to 
1944 and Brillo did not require that specific services be 
performed or that any proof of performance be submitted. 
The court has concl.uded from such examples that A&P must 
have known of' the discriminatory nature of these allowances 
(l.)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 ~d.Supp.626,p.651 
(2) Ibid. ,p.653 
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since it avoided, whenever possible, the making of any specific 
advertising committments and frequently collected allowances 
on a basis of a percentage of quantity purchased rather than 
allowances for services rendered. (1) In short, A&P was 
receiving a price reduction that was not given to the others. 
Rigged Contracts 
It was A&P's contention during the first trial at 
Danvers , Illinois, that the company had no knowledge of the 
preferential treatment it was receiving in allowances. (2) 
The Department of Justice charges that A&P encouraged 
suppliers to violate the Robinson-Patman Act through the use 
of rigged up contracts describing the company 's discounts as 
cost savings allowances or trying otherwise to justify the 
discounts. M.P at tempted to have all its contracts with 
manufacturers state that the buyers were all receiving equal 
and proportionate treatment. (3) But the Brillo case discussed 
above gives evidence that A&P must have known of the discrim-
ination. In 1940, A&P wrote to Brillo and asked if they used 
a form of advertising allowance contract with the rest of the 
trade that differed from A&P's. Brillo replied that it usually 
only allowed six percent and required specific performance. 
This should have placed A&P on notice that it was receiving 
a preferential . allowance that was not available to anyone else. 
(l)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67Fed.Supp.626,p.654 
(2)~. ,p.649 
(3)Ibid.,p.649 
35 
9ther Special Allowance.s 
Further charges have been made that MP demanded 
special advertising allowances for the publication of advert-
isements in which only A&P's merchandise was featured. othe~ 
allowances were for floor space rentals, store sales service, 
label and container allowances, sign space rentals, mass 
displays, and collateral merchandising support. The Justice 
Department says that these services were only pretended ones 
and that actually A&.P only rendered them on its own behalf 
in the ordinary co~rse of retailing its own merchandise. 
The company at one time stated that it was not 
intended that collateral merchandising support be an except-
ional activity, but merely what is done in the ordinary course 
of business. (l) \Vhile it is often a practice in retailing 
to receive special allowances for advertising work done inside 
the store, it appears that the suppliers were actually not 
getting anything in particular done for their money. Further-
more, the allowances must be offered to everyone else on an 
equal basis. One example which is typical shows that MP was 
receiving a discriminatory allowance for labels that it 
furnished to canners. (2) The standard allowance to buyers 
was $1.50 a thousand. A&P claimed that because of better 
quality, it should get $2~00 a thousand • . When one canner 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.654 
(2)Ibid.,p.654 
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objected to this, A&P, stated that it disliked askiqg for a 
higher rate than the canner gave to other customers, but if 
he did not consent to use the $2.00 rate, there was little 
else the company could do except to discontinue buying from 
him. 
The Purchase of Produce 
The Atlantic Commission Compaqy, known as Acco, 
buys about seventy-five percent of the fruits and vegetables 
that are used by MP in retailing and manufacturing. The 
remainder is purchased by the individual store man~ers or 
by the unit buyers from local producers. (1) Acco has 
always acted not only as a purchasing agent for M.P, but 
also as a sales agent for certain suppliers. (2) In other 
words, Acco not only bought for .A&P, but it represented the 
seller in dealing with other buyers who were competitors of 
A&P. The government begins its charges against Acco by 
stating that MP sought to obtain for themselves, under the 
threat to withdraw their patronage, systematic discruninator,y 
price preferences over their retail competitors in the purchase 
of Produce. 
Brokerage Activities 
The first charge against Acco concerns its brokerage 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea co.,67 Fed.SUpp.626 7p.636 (2)Ibid.,p.654 
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activities from 1925 until 1940. The government stated that 
the company had compelled growers, shippers, and jobbers, 
between 1925 and 1936, to pay so called brokerage fees to 
Acco on its purchases of produce for A&P' s retailing subsid-
iaries. This type of' buying was similar tO the method used 
in the purchase of food products by central Headquarters and 
other subsidiaries mentioned above. Acco did not want to pay 
the supplier an unearned brokerage fee and thus increase the 
supplier ' s net price received from .P&P over the net price 
received from other buyers who went through brokers. Vlhen 
the Robinson-Patman Act was passed in 1936, Acco stopped 
taking a direct brokerage .fee .. and adopted a new system. 
During the period of 1936 to 1940, Acco is accused 
of obtaining prj_ce preferences by inducing growers, shippers, 
and jobbers to reduce invoice prices on produce purchased by 
Acco by the amounts paid to the company previously as broker-
age fees. Again, A&P wanted to avoid paying the supplier a 
higher net price than he ordinarily received. H.A.Baum, 
general manager of the company, said in 1937 that, o:f course , 
their customary brokerage and commission rates for regular 
trade sales were to be continued as in the past. (1) In the 
suit brought by the Federal Trade Commission in 1940, Acco 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.SUpp.626,p.655 
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was ordered to stop the practice and discontinue accepti~ 
discriminatory prices. (1) The company then went on to the 
cost savings plan which was based on the giving of discounts 
because of large volume purchased. 
Dual Agency Position of Acco 
The government charges that MP has caused Acco to 
undertake a series of inconsistent functions and obligations 
by acting as a representative for both A&P and other companies 
at the same time in its buying and selling activities. It 
is stated first that Acco acted as selling broker for shippers 
and as buying agent for M.P' s retailing subsidiaries from the 
same shippers. It is claimed by the court that,- as a repres-
entative of the seller or shipper, Acco had the opportunity 
to pick the choicest produce, and as a buyer, Acco could obtain 
the produce for A&P at the lowest price in the market. (2) 
The court stated that under a decision given in a previous 
case, the same person cannot act for himself ·and at the same 
time with respect to the same matter, as an agent for another 
whose interests are conflicting. Thus, a person cannot be a 
purchaser of property and at the same time, an agent for the 
vendor. (3) 
In the second part of the dual cgency. charge, Acco 
(l)Great .A&P Tea Co.v.FTC, 106 F 2d 667 (3rd Cir.l939) 
(2)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,7th Cir.Ct. Appeals1No.922~t2•5 (3)Wardell v.Union Pacific RR co.,l03 U.S.65l,G6L.Ed.~ 
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is accused of acting as b~ing brokers for jobbers and as an 
LCL (less than car load lots) buying agent from the Bame 
jobbers for A&P's retailing subsidiaries. The court· claimed 
that Acco would give its LCL business only to those jobbers 
who bought in car load lots from the company. (1) This 
meant that if the jobbers wanted to hold on to A&P produce 
business, they first had to buy in large ~antities from Acco 
and then . resell to it in small.er quantities. 
Then Acco is char,ged with being an auction seller 
for shippers and acting as auction buyer for .A&P at the same 
auctions, which· would give it an obvious advantage in price. 
Finally, Acco acted as a consignee sell ing consigned merchandise 
both t o A&P and to A&P's competitors. This means that Acco 
could decide whether any shipment would go to A&P or to a 
competitor. The court assumes that if the shipment did go 
to A&P, then it was favored with the best produce that came 
in. If the consignment went to.the trade, the court felt that 
Acco got all that it could for t he produce as a representative 
of the seller. Acco also coll ected brokerage on these -sales 
to competi~ors. (2) 
Sales to COIDRetitors 
.A&P is alleged to have received further price 
(l)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea co.,7th Cir.ct.Appeals,No.922l,p.6 
(2) Ibid. ,p.6 
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preferences and advantages over their competitors by causing 
superior quality produce ··handled by Acco to be diverted to 
A&P and inferior quality handled by them to be diverted to 
A&P's competitors. It was just shown above that this was 
the case when Acco handled consignment goods. About seventy 
percent of the merchandise handled by Acco was shipped to 
A&P and the remaining thirty percent went to the trade. Acco 
was able to collect various forms of brokerage on these sal.es 
to competitors until 1940. (1) The government claims that 
Acco's chief purpose was to procure select ·quality for A&P 
at special prices and to divert relative~ low quali~ prod-
uce to the outside trade at higher prices. . ( 2) 
It can be argued that any company has the right to 
sell surplus produce, but this is not the case. Acco did not 
b~ the produce for A&P first and then decide to resell it 
because it was surplus. This would have been legaJ. and AxP 
could have sold any quality at any price the market was willing 
to pay. Instead, Acco was representing the shipper or 
supplier of produce, and it had the option of buying either 
for itself or selling to competing buyers. Acco was acting 
as a selling agent and as a buying agent at the same time on 
the same transaction, and since it was owned by A&P, this 
would constitute a decided advantage that was not open to 
other buyers who went through norn1al brokers. 
\l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.633 
(2)Ibid.,p.633 
It is also charged that Acco refrained from taking 
cash discounts on produce bought for others than M.P. If 
the advantage of the discounts given by suppliers was open 
only to A&P, and it was withheld from competing buyers, then 
the competing buyers were discriminated against. But, _ ~~ile 
it is possible that Acco tried to get everythiqg it could 
on sales to competitors, it could not raise its prices too 
high. Acco was not the only seller on the market and buyers 
had the opportunity t o go to other brokers. This would mean 
that while Acco did get merchandise for A&P at a low price, 
it could not go above the normal market price on its sales 
to others. Therefore, the important consideration would be 
the dual capacity in which Acco acted rather than any large 
scale discrimination. Acco's profits in 1939 constituted 
5.08% of A&P's total profits; 5.62% in 1940; and 7.16% in 
1941. (1) These profits came not only from sales to A&P's 
competitors, but from MP itself. This would mean that the 
actual profit from outside sales would be lower than the 
percentage figure . given . above. 
Special Buyigg Terms 
A&P is alleged to have obtained another type of 
discriminatory discount by compelling the shippers to extend 
cash discounts to Acco on its purchases of produce for A&P 
(l)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,7th Cir.ct.Appeals,NQ.922l,p.6 
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without requiri~ Acco to assmne the usual risks undertaken 
by cash buyers. This type of buying is known as being on a 
cash f.o.b.shipper basis. Normally the buyer pqys cash for 
the produce at the shipping point and then assumes all risks 
connected with the transportation of the merchandise. This 
actuallY means a cost saving to the seller when the transaction 
is compared to the usual terms of buying in which credit is 
extended and the seller is responsible for the goods until 
they reach their destination. Therefore, the buyer is en-
titled to a legal discount off the usual price. Vlhen 'Acco 
bought produce on a cash f.o.b. shipper basis, it did not 
assume the risks , but made the seller responsible for the 
condition of the goods until they arrived. The seller had 
none of the usual advantages of the transaction except that 
Acco paid in cash. This meant that the seller was giving 
an unearned disc.ount to Acco. 
H.A.Baum, general manager of Acco, wrote to one 
of his employees in 1940 and stated that if Acco was unable 
to inspect the produce before shipment, then it was the 
responsibility of the seller on a cash f.o .b. point of ship-
ment basis to see that the produce arrived in U.S.No.l 
condition. He added that the seller must assume the losses 
incurred by Acco in making any adjustments or resale of this 
merchandise. (1.) 
(1) U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.657 
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Acco also had another system of buying known as a 
sales arr ival basis of purchasing produce. .A&P is alleged to 
have insisted that shippers , who sell produce to Acco on 
sales arrival terms, surrender to Acco the right to fix 
unilaterally the prices to be paid for such produce. A prin-
cipal will often give his broker the right to establish prices 
on the produce handled through the broker, and these prices 
will be binding on the principal.. But Acco was no ordinary 
broker and while it served the shippers, it also served as 
a buying broker for M::P and thus had two principal-s at the 
same time. Since Acco was a totally owned subsidiar,y of A&P, 
it is safe t o assume that A&P would benefit in the setting 
of price on produce. 
Another practice that the government disapproved of 
was the requirement that some independent jobbers were made 
follow of buying through and paying Acco a profit or brokerage 
fee on carlots of produce as a condition of selling less than 
carlots of produce back to A&P's retailing subsidiaries. 
Under this plan, Acco did not agree to buy back any specific 
quantity, but it did agree to give them preference in patronage. 
(1) When A&P does buy back less than carload lots, it is 
getting the produce at a lower price than competitors because 
the chain has already collected money from the seller of the 
carload in. the form of a brokerage fee .• 
(l)u.s.v.Great M.P Tea co. ,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.658 
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Acco is fUrther accused of selling carlots of 
produce to independent jobbers under agreements providing 
that .A&P can repurchase parts of the same produce from the 
same jobbers in LCL quantities at the same prices paid by 
the jobber for carlots. One of A&P 's practices in regard to 
t his was to waive the brokerage charge on the produce bought 
from the jobber on the condition that the jobber make the 
sale at the same price he paid for the goods in carlots. (1) 
This means that when Acco goes into the market for LCL lots 
of produce, it can get the goods at a lower price than other 
buyers. The practice might be looked at as a mere cancelli~ 
. of a sale between Acco and a jobber, and Acco is allowed to 
take back produce that it has just sold and at the same price. 
But it is not as simple as that. · Once the carlot is sold by 
Acco to the broker, it is completely out of Acco's hands. 
\Vhen Acco goes to repurchase produce in the open market, 
there are many jobbers in competition with each other, and 
who want Acco's business. It is implied by the court in the 
char.ges that Acco is discriminating by picking out only a few 
of these jobbers to buy from, and also that in so doing, Acco 
is receiving a discriminatroy price. It may be that the 
seriousness of this practice is debatable, but the courts have 
called it discrimination and. thus made it against the law. (2) 
\l)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.658 
(2)Ibid.,p.658 
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Another buying practice that the court objects to 
is that of collecting unecessary and duplicate broker~e fees 
on produce transactions among others than Acco, where no 
broker~e service has been r endered by Acco and where the 
actual broker~e service has been previously performed and 
collected by independent brokers. In other words, when a 
buyer has made a purchase through an independent broker , in 
order to maintain the goodwill of Acco, he has to arrange the 
same transaction through Acco and pay Acco a broker~e fee. 
The court has shown that this was the case with such companies 
as the Gordon Fruit and Produce Company of New Haven, De Carlo 
of Buffalo, and Mercurio Company of Providence. (1) A&P 
disclaimed all knowledge of such transactions and stated that 
they only collected brokerage where an actual service was 
rendered. ( 2) 
O~anizigg the Growers and Sbi£2~ 
The government charges that Acco put MP in a 
preferential position by secretly organizing , controlling, 
and dominating cooperative associations of growers and shippers 
handling substantial portions of the annual fresh fruit and 
vegetable crop of the United States and inducing such assoc-
iations to turn over such produce to Acco for disposal to 
A&P and to others on such terms., conditions, and prices as 
(l)U. S.v.Great MP Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp .626,p.659 
(2)Ibid.,p .659 
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Acco elects. It .is also alleged that MP organized contact 
committees of growers and shippers of produce in order to 
bring such producers more closely within Acco 's influence 
and tbereby to increase Acco ' s preferential buying oppor-
tunities. 
Acco had attempted s.everal times to establish a 
close relationship with producers' cooperatives and tried 
to exert some influence over them. In some instances, the 
cooperative managers were even on Acco•s payroll, and Acco 
worked closely with such cooperatives as the Florida Citrus 
Growers and the Farmers' Cooperative of North Carolina. (1) 
The outstanding example of this program was the case of the 
National Cooperative Fruit and Vegetable Association. 
The National Coop was first suggested by Acco in 
1938. Carl B,yoir, head of Business Or,ganization,Inc., offer-
r ed to assist in the setting up of the organization, and he 
helped plan and carry out the idea by which producers and 
shippers would organize to plan the marketing.of their produce 
at a ·lmver cost. The Department of .Agriculture rejected the 
idea when A&P tried to determine the legality of the cooper-
·ative. It stated that the organization must originate independ-
ently from- the producers . and that they could not be brought 
~l)U. S.v .Great MP 'I'ea Co., 67 Fed. Supp.626,p. 659 
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together by A&P. (l) H.A.Baum, manager of Acco, the took 
the attitude that the cooperative was the producers ' idea 
and that Acco was merely being helpful. (2) At a preliminary 
conference , for which A&P footed the bill, a J~. Parrish, 
who had occasionaly worked for Acco , nominated McDaniel of 
the iwutual Orange Distributors .Association. McDaniel had 
alwqys been friendly to Acco and had continually sold it the 
produce of his organization. (3) The cooperative spread 
rapidly; Acco promised to return to the group a part of its 
earnings and the producers were able to market their goods 
at less cost. It also meant that Acco , being the major 
broker dealt with by the cooperative, was able to buy a 
larger percent of better produce at lower cost . 
But despite the claim that the cooperative was 
independent, Acco had a voice in nearly all of its operations. 
A&P tried to keep its name out of the organization as much 
as possible and kept in the background. But Baum saw to it 
that McDaniel gave out the lists of names for the final org-
anization committee that had been selected by Acco. The 
members of the executive committee frequently consulted Baum 
and advised other members to consult both he and Byoir. (4) 
(l)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,pp.660-661 
(2)Ibid.,pp.~60-661 
(3)Ibid.,pp.660-661 
(4)Ibid.,pp.660-661 
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Acco attempted to have the cooperative state that 
other companies could dea1 wi tb them on exactly the same 
terms as A&P. Two dealers were contacted, one of them 
through the assistance of Acco. {l) But by 1942, the legal 
complications were becoming increasingly serious, and John 
Hartford stated that A&P and Acco could not help the coopera-
tive any more. He claimed that nothing improper had been 
done and that they had been motivated by a desire to help 
growers to eliminate middleman costs and reduce prices to 
the consumers. (2) It would have accomplished these thiqgs 
through the agency of Acco, and A&P would have certainly 
bene:fi ted from having a steady source o:f supply of :large 
quantities of top quaJ.ity produce. 
The court has not denied that the cooperatives 
and A&P were both honestly striving to help the shippers. 
It has, however, asserted that through the use of .A&P 's 
integrated power and control, it was able to bring · its in-
fl.uence to bear so as to obtain prices less than those of 
competitors. (3) 
Allocation of Acco Profits 
The final. charge against Acco states that MP 
had a discriminatory advantage by a:llocating Acco 's pro:f'i ts, 
(l)u.s.v.Great A&P Tea co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,pp.662-663 
(2)Ibid. 7p.663 (3)Ibid. ,p.663 
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on sales to A&P's competitors and on brokerage transactions 
on behal.f of others than A&P, to A&P 1 s ret~ling subsidiaries 
in the form of credits to their retail operations. The 
government has stated that it is not the system of allocation 
of profits that they object to; it is the predator,y method 
by which the profits are accumulated. (l) It has been 
shown above that Acco Undoubtedly collected broker~e fees 
and received lower prices that were not available to other 
competitors. It has been argued that brokerage fees on sales 
to other than A&P actually represented fees for services 
rendered that the producers would have to pey elsewhere. ( 2) 
This is perfectly true, but at the time Acco gave these 
services, it was representing not only its client who was 
selling or buying produce, but A&P as well. As agent for 
both sides of the transaction, Acco was. collecting illegal. 
fees for its servic.es. 
Interference,. With The . Bqying Opportunities_ 
. of Competitors .. . 
A&P is accused by the Department of Justice of 
further conspiring and restraining commerce by interfering 
unreasonably with the buying opportunities of competing 
retailers. The first of the alleged met.hc;>ds of carrying 
this out concerns A&P requiring many suppliers to increase 
(l)U.s.v.G~eat A&P Tea co. ,7th Cir.ct.AppeaJ.s,No.922l,p.8 
(2) "Trouble Begins in the New Sherman Act" ,Yale Law Journal 
Vol.58No.6,M~l949,p.9?8 
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prices charged and to be charged to competing retailers 
for store delivered food and food products. It was becomiqg 
the practice about 1938 for some manufacturers to deliver 
shipments directly to the doors of independent retail 
stores who had no warehouse facilities• · These deliveries 
were made with no extra cost and often at car lot prices. 
M P prevailed upon a number of manufacturers to stop this 
practice since they claimed it was ·putting MP's warehouses 
at a disadvantage. They urged the 'manufacturers to widen 
the spread between themselves and the retailer. But at 
the same time, MP was at tempting to secure direct deli v-
eries to their supermarkets under the same terms. (1) The 
. -
statement made by M:P at the time said that it ha'i expanded 
the direct delivery to its supermarkets to affect econo-
mies. It added that it knew the company was inconsistent 
since it ha'i urged the manufacturer to widen the _ spread 
between direct delivery and warehouse delivery. (2) 
The second method of interference was to require 
many suppliers to discontinue the offering of premium deals 
to competing retailers in connection with their purchases 
of food and food products. These premiwns often amounted to 
price reductions to the buyers, and manufacturers used them 
in sale·s promotions. A&P ' s counsel advised them in l941 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.655 
( 2) Ibid. ,p. 655 
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to go easy when persuading manufacturers to stop giving 
premiums, and he added that their threat of boycot ts amGunted 
to a violation Gf the Antitrust laws. A&P denied compulsion 
was used on the manufacturers, and the counsel advised it to 
be very cagey, adding that a boycott might be asswned if 
A&P and an association it was operating with at the time 
agreed not to handle the goods of the suppliers. ( 1) 
A&P' s third method of interference was by entering 
into a series of agreements with many suppliers providing 
that competing retailers, whose lack of capital and storage 
facilities requires them to buy in job lots through brokers, 
would no longer be permitted to buy the food and food products 
of such suppliers through brokers. This concerns .A&P ' s plan 
put into effect in 1940, in which they decided to buy direct 
from suppliers who promised to sell only this way . ( 2. ) 
The government charges that this puts a burden on compet-
itors and gives .A&P a buying. advantage. not open to all . 
Effects of the Cons2iracl 
The complaint in the present case lists several 
effects from the actions t aken by A&P. The first of these 
states that A&P has successfUlly frustrated a series of 
attempts by the Federal Trade Commdssion, various Federal 
Courts , and the Congress of the United States, over a period 
( l)U. s . v.Great A&P Tea Co., 67 Fed.Supp.626,p . 655 
(2)Note page 25 of this chapter. 
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of many years, to require A&P to buy regularly on terms 
proportionately equal to those on which A&P's competitors 
buy. As has been indicated in chapter II, .A&P has been 
brought to court several times by the FTC or the Department 
of Justice. The trial in the Illinois District Court was 
the first time that the company was found guilty. After the 
appeal failed in the Chicago seventh Circuit court of Appeals, 
.A&P claimed that it went to the Department of Justice and 
asked their help in aiding A&P to conform to the court dec-
isions. (1) The Department told A&P to submit plans for 
changes, but did not suggest what changes to make. Each plan 
was rejected by the Antitrust Division and negotiations were 
still going on at the time the present complaint was filed 
in New York. 
It is possible to interpret this first statement of 
the effects to mean that any buyer cannot make purchases at 
a proportionately lower price than his competitors. If he 
has the opportunity to get in on a special deal or bargain, 
· he must turn it down unless everyone else is offered the 
same deal. It can be said that this would tend to restrict 
price competition which is part of the competitive picture 
that the court wishes to protect. The competing retailers are 
not to be allowed to ge.t the better of each other in making 
~l)Talk by John Brennan,v.P. of Middle western Div. of A&P, 
to the Assc.of 1:\f.Y.State canners, Dec.9,1949 
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purchases. Thus, the chains should not be able to purch~se 
more efficiently than the independent retailers because it 
would constitute an unfair advantage to the chains. 
But this is too literal an interpretation. It 
actually means that any one seller has to give proportionately 
equal terms to all buyers. A buyer would still have the 
r~ht to go to another seller and receive a lower price than 
his competitor would from the first seller. He will also 
be able to manufacture his own foQd products and thus obtain 
them at a cheaper price. .A&:.P over a period of years has 
tried in many wqys to get price concessions that were not 
available to other .buyers. It has claimed that it knew of 
no illegal concessions, but the court stated that it could 
not possibly help but know of the conditions surrounding its 
purchasing activities. (1) 
No Proof of Coercion of Buying Preferences 
The goverrunent seys that another effect arising 
from the activities of the company is that proof of specific 
occurances is difficult to find. It is charged that .A&P 
has so continuously educated their suppliers, over a period 
of many years, to the necessity of extending buyi~ prefer-
ences as a condition for securing their patronage, that 
A&P may now ~ominate buying negotiations with their suppliers 
(l)U.s.v.Great MP •rea co. ,67 Fed.Supp.626,pp.650 and 678 
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without resorting to express threats and accordingly, it has 
now, or will soon, become virtually impossible for the Federal 
enforcement agencies (a) to adduce proof that A&P has coerced 
buying preferences, or (b) to meet the hypothetical defense 
that buying preferences have been unwittingly thrust upon 
.M:.P. 
This is one of the weak points of the case. The 
Antitrust lawyers have attempted to overcome a lack of 
specific proof by saying that .M.P 's influence has made it 
impossible to get the real truth about the company 's actions. 
It is asking the court to ignore the protests of .M.P that 
the chain tried to act within the law and did not know of 
specific buying preferences. In attempting to demonstrate 
that the overall picture points to monopoly, the prosecution 
may tend to attach an importance to the actions of' the 
company that is somewhat exagerated. 
Effects of. Dual Agency of Acco 
'Jibe Department of J-ustice states that A&:P has 
assumed and abused multiple, irreconciliable, fiduciary 
ob~~ations in the produce field by causing Acco to utilize 
its inconsistant contractual relationships with growers, 
shippers, jobbers and competing retailers, to secure price 
and quality preferences for A&P in disregard of the fiduciary 
rights of all of Acco' s principals except .A&P. This allegation 
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has been discussed above in the chapter. It is one of the 
strong points of the government ' s suit. Judge Lindley, of 
the Illinois District Court, said that Acco was the rotten 
thread of the fabric and it so permeates the entire structure 
and ties together the other threads so as to result in an 
imperfeet and illegal product-- unreasonable interference 
with competition and the power to monopolize. (1) 
It is added that since produce is sold on the basis 
of quality appraisals that cannot be mathematically exact, 
and in general relation to rapidly fluctuating market levels, 
Acco's simultaneous representation of various principals , 
of inconsistent interest and at all levels of produce dist-
ribution, has rendered it virtually impossible for Federal 
enforcement agencies to (a) adduce proof of instances in 
which Acco has knowingly favored A&P ' s retailing subsid-
iaries to the detriment of its other principals, or (b) meet 
the hypothetical defense that the prices paid by the 
retailing subsidiaries were the result of temporary market 
reductions or quality failures. This is an attempt by the 
government to meet another logical argument on the part of 
MP. They wish to forestall any covering up of actual evidence 
with the defense by A&P that the circumstances were t he 
result of changes in market price. 
(1) U.S.v.Great A&P 'I'ea Co ,6? Fed.Supp .626,p.679 
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Changes Asked for in Buying Procedur e 
The J ustice Department f irst asks that the Atlantic 
Commissi on Co. be dissol ved and t hat A&P be enjoined from 
ever allowing any part of it to engage in t he dual functions 
of buying for A&P and for M P' s competitors . This seems to 
be a reasonable demand on the part of the Antitrust Division. 
Taken alone , it does not mean that .A&P cannot buy for itself. 
As a large buyer , A&P can still cover markets all over the 
country and through ·efficient operation, keep the costs of 
purchasing down to a minimum. But , the full demands of the 
J·ustice Department will mean a different situation. There 
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will be seven separate chains if the government wins the case. 
There will have to be separate buying departments for each of 
these, in competition with each other. Whether they can operate 
as efficiently or not is a question that will be reserved 
for the final chapter, but it can be noted here that regional 
chains such as Stop and Shop i n Massachusetts and First 
National in New England a~ doing an efficient job of competing 
with A&P on price and intelligent purchasi~. 
The government next a sks that all the other buying 
offices be abol ished such as the Headquarters Purchasing 
Departments , the National Departments for the purchase of 
meat , butter, and poultry products , the Merchandising Comm-
ittee, the field buying offices , and the Divisional Directors 
of Purchases . This action could only be t aken in the event 
that the entire plan of di viding up A&P received the approval 
of the court. Each individual chain would then have its 
own purchasing department. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that MP has undoubtedly 
broken the law in several instances. Broker~e fees taken 
on direct purchases, preferential advertising, and other 
allowances , as well as discriminatory prices are all violations 
of the Robinson-Patman Act. (1) Acco ' s position as an 
agent for two princi pals at the same time in the same trans-
action has also been shown to be ~ainst the law. The court 
has stated that it is probably true ·that many actions of the 
company, when standing alone , are devoid of wrongful character, 
but when considered as a whole, there is a corrupt thread 
running through the completed texture and the whole becomes 
a tainted product . Since all have partaken in the creation 
of the product , they must be char,ged with the responsibilty 
for the product . (2) Thus , the government ha s said that A&P, 
as an entirety, is responsible for the wrongdoings of any part 
of it, and as such, the entire company must be broken into 
segments . 
(1) 49 St at . l526(1936) 715 u.s.c. sec . l 3 (1946) ( 2) U.S. v .Great A&P Tea Co . 767 Fed.Supp. 626 7p .679 
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Chapter IV 
RETAILING OPERATIONS OF MP 
The five thousand stores in the A&P chain cover 
nearly all the eastern section of the United States with 
some stores in lower California and the state of washington . 
The stores are serviced by thirty-seven warehousing units 
and these , in turn, are divided up into seven large divisions. 
The divisions are alui.ost like separate chains except that 
purchasing and policy controls are highly centrali zed in the 
main New York offices. 
Contribution of the Manufacturing Subsidiaries 
As an integrated firm, M:P is able to obtain many 
of its food prodUcts from its manufacturing subsidiaries at 
a lower price than from independent produc,ers. When products 
are distributed from the manufacturing divisions to the retail 
stores, an accounting entry is made recording their sale to 
the retail divisions. The prices recorded for these goods are 
higher than the actual cost of manufacturing and distribution 
from the factory. Thi s means that the manufacturing subsid-
iaries show a paper profit through an accepted accounting pro-
cedure which is granted by the courts . (1) These profits are 
later distributed among the retailing divisions. 
The government objects to the practice of the manu-
U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co. ,7th Cir.Ct.Appeals,No . 922l ,p.7 
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facturing plants selling at a lower cost to A&P retail stores 
than it sells to others. It states that A&P has utilized its 
food manufacturing and processi~ plants and facilities in 
such a manner as to insure that A&P secures food and food 
products both from their own manufacturing subsidiaries and 
from other manufacturers at lower prices than those paid by 
their retail competitors for the same food and food products. 
Four specific charges fall under this heading. All of the 
charges discussed in the chapter are taken from the present 
complaint filed in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York under civil ac t ion No.52-139. 
Sales .rvrade at Lower Prices to M P 
The Justice Department first charges that M:P sold 
the food and food products manufactured in their own plants 
(a) to A&P' s competitors at regu1ar bi lling prices, and (b) 
to A&P ' s retailing subsidiaries at less than regular billing 
prices when necessary to circumvent State Iv.Tinimum Markup Laws 
or to underprice other retailers handling brands of comparable 
quality manufactured . by other producers • 
. Minimum Markup Laws exist in many states. They are 
designed to prevent sales at below cost, cost being defined as 
the cost of the goods plus a certain percentqge to cover 
operating costs. If a large store buys goods cheaper than a 
small store, it could undersell the small store whether the 
law of the state fixed invoice cost or invoice cost plus a 
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given percentqge of markup as the minimum selling price. (l) 
I t is alleged by the government that A&P avoids this minimUlll 
markup restriction by selling at a lower price to itself than 
it sells to competitors. 
Previous records dispute the government's contention 
that the manufacturing subsidiaries even sell to competitors 
of A&P. Both the Illinois District Court and the seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals state specifically that the various 
manufacturing subsidiaries produce food products only under 
the M:.P labels and that they sell only to M.P. (2) The 
-
Department of Justice m~ have some new evidence to clear up 
this inconsistancy, but it doubtfUl whether it will be an 
important contribution. 
Furthermore, assuming that A&P did sell to its com-
petitors at a higher price than to itself, is there anything 
illegal or wrong with this practice? Selling costs to itself 
would be almost nothing compared to ·selling costs to compet-
i tors. Trans:portation and handling costs would al.so be less. 
This alone could account for the lower price. To carry it one 
step ~urther, A&P wou~d actual~y be se~~ing surp~us food 
products. What is there to prevent the company from getting 
the best price it can for these goods? The manufacturing 
(~)Converse & Huegy,"Elements of Marketing",(Prentice-Hall 
Inc.,l946) pp.l70-17l (2)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,7th Cir.Ct.Appeals,No.922l,p.7 
U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,pp.633-634 
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subsidiaries could ship merchandise to the A&P retaili~ 
divisions directly without charging a bookkeeping price 
if it wanted to do so. I t does not necessarily follow that 
they must also sell to their competitors at manufacturing 
costs. This would deprive them of any profit on the merch-
andise. 
The Justice Department s~s that the lower costs 
are used to avoid Minimum Markup Laws. I t may be just a 
coverup f'or a weak charge . The billing prices used when 
A&P sells its own goods to itself are bookkeeping prices and 
do not reflect any actual cash payments for food products. 
The J ustice Department adds that the lower costs 
are used to underprice other retailers handling brands of 
comparable quality manufactured by other manufacturers. If 
the government seriously means to include this as a part of 
the charges against .A&P , then it:is .. de:feating its purpose of 
· protecting competition. I t can be implied from this that 
competition among brands of comparable quality cannot be 
conducted on a price basis. To prohibit price competition 
among brands wou~d mean the prohibition of' much of' the 
competition in marketing. I t would mean that private brands 
would sell at the same price as national brands . I t would mean 
that the opportunity to undersell a competitor had been taken 
away from the storekeeper on the sales of his food products. 
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Pressure on Other Manufacturers 
The Department of Justice next states that A&P 
secured lower prices for its retailing subsidiaries by 
entering upon, withdrawing from, or agreeing to abstain 
from the manufacture of particular foods and food products 
primarily with the intent and purpose of thereby depressing 
food prices to be offered and quoted to MP for similar 
products of comparable quality put out by other manufacturers. 
The government has stated that this action of 
bringing pressure on the manufacturer amounts to coercion and 
that it gives .P&P lower prices than those available to other 
buyers. (1) Most of the aspects of this charge have already 
been discussed in chapter III in relation to the buying oper-
ations of the company. It can be added here that certain parts 
of this particular charge can be questioned. 
The Justice Department feels that the primary 
consideration on the part of A&P is to lower prices and that 
there is something wrong with this. If coercion is used and 
special prices are given, the charge would hold true. But , 
is there anything wrong with A&P manufacturing its ·own products 
or buying elsewhere in order to avoid what it feels is too 
high a price. If M.P can make a product at a lower price, 
then it has evecy right to do so, and it should also be able 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.640 
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to pass the savings on' to the consumer in the form of a 
lower price . If they believe they can buy more cheaply 
somewhere else then they can do so. The particular charge 
in this section is worded so as to imply that it will cause 
prices of other manufacturers to be depressed if .A&P takes 
either of the two above courses. Perhaps it will, but it 
would appear to be more the result of competition than an 
illegal act. 
The courts can interpret a restraint. of trade and 
the receipt of preferential discounts and allowances only 
when specific examples can show that, through coercion, 
A&P pressured manufacturers into giving them a lower price 
than offered to anyone else. It should not attempt to say 
I 
that bargaining with suppliers :for lower prices or the seek~ 
ing of other sources are also attempts to obtain discrimina-
tory concessions. 
This leads up to the next charge in connection with 
this in which the Justice Department says that A&P coerced 
other food manufacturers to sell particular foods and food 
products to A&P at discriminatory prices by means of threats 
that A&P will themselves engage upon the manufacture of such 
products if discriminatory prices are not granted. 
The courts have said that they are only interested 
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i n what actually happened, not what M:P and its suppliers 
said about discriminator,y prices. They added that A&P 
had been far from,. meticulous in acceptance of preferences, 
which under the facts and circumstances , they knew, or 
should have known, other purchasers did not receive. (1) 
-At a later date, the courts said that whether or not .A&:P 
in adducing and knowingly receiving these price discrimina-
tions, was in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, as its 
suppliers certainly were, the advantqge which A&P thereby 
obtained from its competitors was an unlawful restraint in 
itself. (2) It has not been too clear through the case 
just how threatening A&P was, nor have the courts fully 
explained it. Instead, they have said in effect that the 
price discr iminations were there, therefore, they must have 
been forced from the suppliers in one w~ or another. It 
appears to be a veiled suggestion that the suppliers were 
scared to buck the large size of A&P and that bigness and 
power lay behind the conc.essions given to the chain. 
Allocation of Manufacturing Profits 
A&P has then been charged with utilizing the pro-
fi ts of their manufacturi~ subsidiaries, on sales to A&P 's 
competitors, :first, to offset losses or profit reductions 
occasioned by their reduced billings to .A&.P's retail stores 
(l)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea co .,67 Fed.Supp.626 7p.650 (2)u.s.v.Great A&P Tea co.,7th Cir.ct.Appeals,No .922l ,p.9 
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as ment ioned above, and then by allocating all residual 
pr ofits to the r et ail stores in the :for m o:f credits to their 
retail oper ations . The so- called h~her pr ofits have been 
discussed above i n r elation to the :fir st charge in t his 
section. (1) It was asserted t hat A&P had ever y right to 
charge higher pr i ces to others than herself and that the 
profits coul d be earned legally . The profits :from the manu-
facturing operations are, on the whole, bookkeeping profits 
made on ficticuous prices charged by the manufacturing sub-
sidiaries to the retail stores . The money supporting the 
operations of these subsidiaries comes from the actual sale 
of the goods at the retail level , and therefore , any cash 
profits must also come :from the retail sales. A:ny allocation 
of profits from the manufacturing subsidiaries is actually a 
system of returning the money to its real source , the retail 
store. I f ru1y profits were made by the manufacturing sub-
sidiaries from any other sources , A&P, as an integrated 
firm, can justifiably apply them to its retailing operations . 
Elimination of compe t i tiQQ 
M P is alleged to have attempted to expand its 
retail sales, increa se its percentage participation in 
selected ret ai l areas,and to suppress and to eliminate the 
competition of the independent grocer s , meat dealers, and 
local food chains . This is the charge that the small retail 
( l ) See P~es 61 and 62 of this chapter. 
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store operators would like to see proven. several methods 
of accomplishing the extermination of P.&.P • s competitors 
have been included in the complaint. 
Use of Saviggs from Discriminatory Buying 
The first unfair advantage that M P is alleged to 
have is that they credit to retail operations the savings 
resulting from their discriminatory buying program so as 
to permit them to undersell retail competitors . These 
savings contributed 22.15% to profits in 1939 , 22.47% in 
1940, and 24 . 59% in 1941. (1 ) The figures are taken to 
represent typical years . But the court did not state what 
part of these percentages were legal or illegal . Many low 
margin stores depend on the discounts they receive, for their 
profits . Much of the discount percentage arrived at above 
could be properly earned, and,as such, applied to the total 
profits o:f the company. 
The remaining illegal percentage does constitute 
an unfair advantage which would allow A&P to cut its retail 
prices . But it can be questioned as to how serious this 
unfair advantage is, and whether or not it constitutes a 
serious link in the chain of monopolistic practices. In the 
middle 1930 ' s, the Feder al Trade Commission issued a report 
on chain stores which stated that lower buying prices than 
( l )U. S. v .Great A&P Tea Co., ? th Ci r.ct . Appeals ,No. 922l ,p . 4 
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were available to independents were a most substantial, if 
not the chief factor, in the lower selling prices enjoyed by 
the chains . (1) But the commissions statement has been shown 
to be open to dispute through the use of its own statistics . 
(2) In the study, it was shown that in washington,D.C. there 
was a ~ .42% savings in the chain store price compared to the 
independents . 1.42% of this was the result of having a lower 
cost of merchandise while 5% of it was due to having a lower 
gross margin brought about by more efficient operation. The 
same situation existed in Memphis and Detroit, the two other 
cities studied by the commission. I n all , it was stated that 
16.4% of the independen~s higher prices can be traced to a 
higher cost of merchandise over the chain ~ while 83.6% of the 
higher prices are a result of a higher gross margin. Thus, 
it was sho~n that the emphasis should not be on the buying 
advantage as much as on the greater operating efficiency of 
the chain which help it to reduce gross margin. The percentage 
that the buying advantages contribute to the lower prices in 
the A&P retail stores is not known, but even the courts admit 
that the ef ficient operations of A&P go far towards contrib-
uting to its lower prices. (3) Vlliile it is true that A&P's 
buying advantage does contain some discriminatory earnings, 
{l)Senate Doc.No.4, 74th Congress,lst session (1934) p .53 
(2)C.F. Phillips, 11 FTC Chain Store Investigation",Journal of 
I~rketing, Vol .II,No .3: Jan.l938,pp.l90-191 (3)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co. ,67 Fed.Supp.626 ,p.676 
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they probably do not constitute a serious monopolistic 
activity. The buying program could be easily a1 tered to 
get rid of these alleged preference and A&P could still retain 
the bulk of its selling advantage on a legal basis. 
Use of the Profits from Acco 
A&P is next char,ged with utilizing the profits 
secured from Acco •s inconsistant functioning on the behalf 
of A&P and its competitors as credits to A&P' s retail oper-
ations for the purpose of underselling retail competitors. 
This is one of the more serious char,ge s against M.P. Acco 
did make a profit on its transactions which were often of an 
illegal nature . When these profits are allocated to the 
retail stores, they can aid in r educing the price of merch-
andise to the consumer and thus constitute an unfair advant-
age for .A&P. Typical profits from the operation of Acco 
presented by the court were 5 . 08% of the total profits in 
1939, 5.62% in 1940, and 7.16% in 1941. (1) 
Q§e of the Profits from Manufacturing 
A&P is charged with utilizing the profits secured 
from their manufacturing operations , on sales to their retail 
stores and on sales to their retail competitors at proport-
ionat.ely unequal prices , as credits to A&P ' s retail operations 
for the purpose of increasiD..g 1\&P ' s ability to undersell their 
(l) U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co .,7th Cir .Ct.Appeals ,No .922l,p. 6 
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competitors at retail. This has already been discussed before 
in the chapter when it was pointed out that there was nothing 
ill~al about the manufacturing profits or their allocation. 
(l) It is a practice which every integrated firm should be 
able to enjoy. If the profits from the manufacturing subsid-
iaries allow A&P to undersell their competitors, it is due to 
operating efficiency and not to any illegal or monopolistic 
practices. 
Selling Below the Cost of Doing Business in Selected Areas 
The two final charges against MP are important 
and contraversial. They will be discussed together since 
they concern the same action. The first states that A&.P 
suppresses competition by selling below its cost of doing 
business in selected retail areas and recouping such losses 
by selling at higher prices in less competitive areas. The 
second charge is a summary of all those in this section. 
A&P is charged with selecting local areas throughout the 
United .States wherein they sell at retail below their cost of 
doing business at retail and below their prices in other retail 
areas until the desired percentage occupation of such selected 
retail markets is achieved, using income from other retail 
areas and from all their manufacturing subsidiaries and Acco, 
as well as from the savings accrued from discriminatory 
buying practices to offset the losses or reductions incident 
(l)See pages 61 and 62 of this chapter. 
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to such selected area price cutting. 
These t~o charges boil down to the allegation that 
A&P is able to cut prices in some areas by raising prices in 
others and by using other profits that have an illegal taint 
to them. The court claims that the actual percent of the 
total profits made by the retailing oper ations amounted to 
6 . 31% in 1939, 9.37% in 1940, and 10 .98% in 1941. (1) These 
are typical per cent figures of the chain ' s operations. 
A&P was faced with an increasingly toQgh competitive 
picture in the early 1930 ' s . It did not want to lose its 
volume of trade and the government contends that A&P wanted 
25% of the available business in the communit i es in which 
it oper ated. (2) I n order to keep this vol ume or to gain it, 
the retail stor es in certain areas would cut their gross 
margin percentage and lower t he price on many items of f ood. 
For a while , the stor es would lose r~ney, but once the volume 
goal was reached, the stor es would make money again, and at 
the new lower pri ces . (3) 
The government charges that when the price cutting 
takes place, M P i s f or ced to oper ate those stor es at below 
their cost o~ . doing business. The government does not s et 
any parti cular s t andards f or t hese costs , but it is true that 
(l) U.S.v .Great A&P Tea Co.,7th Ci r.Ct . Appeals,No .922l , p .8 (2)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co .,67 Fed.Supp . 626,p .642 
(3) Ibi d . ,p. 642 
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while a store is att empting t o gain a per cent age of the volume 
of t rade through a r educed margi n , its expense r~te will .for 
a time be higher than the gross margin . But , once t hat 
store does reach its objective, it has increased its margins 
in dollars by a considerable f igure . The expenses will remain 
relatively fixed , and this will mean the expense percentage 
will drop in relation to the gross margin, and the store vall 
once again be making a profit. Therefore , while the store 
does operate below the cost of doing business,i.e. its expense 
rate, as soon as it recovers its desired volume at a lower 
gross margin, it also begins to operate within its ·cost o:f 
doing business and make a pro:fi t. 
I t is difficult for any large company covering over 
half of the countr.y to maintain unifor m prices in all its 
retail outlets . Competition in various areas has been ve~ 
keel), especially in New England. Stop and Shop ha s increased 
sales per store almost ni ne times more than they were in 1938 
while A&P has only increased its sales per store five times 
over the 1938 figure. (1) First National has also given A&P 
keen competition in the same area and to combat this, M.P 
made a reduction in gross margins and prices so that for a 
period f rom 1934 to 1940 , A&P suffer ed an operating loss in 
the reg ion. A Mr.Byrnes in charge of the Division at the time 
(l) "Repor t on Grocery Distribution", a study made by .I,his week 
Magazine, 1949 
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said that the Quaker Maid all owances and t he advertising 
money collected by the purchasing department provided funds 
which allowed them to operate in the red. (1) 
Headquarters directed that the gross margin rate 
of supermarkets should generally not exceed 10% of net sales 
even though the average supermarket expense rate was higher 
at the time. (2) But the situation did not mean that A&P 
was cutting their own throat and that the gross margin was 
too low. In 1933, the average gross markup or margin was 
23% f or grocery stores. Albers Supermarkets,Inc., which had 
just recently opened up , decided to set their gross mar.gin 
at 15%. The lower prices had an immediate effect on sales and 
the company was able to lower the margin to 12~. The company 
attributed the fact that they could operate on the low 
gross margin not only to increased volume, but also to 
operating efficiency and superior merchandising. (3) There-
fore, it i s not at all unreasonable to assume that a larger 
company such as A&P operating with an integrated system 
could set their gross margin lower than is customary in the 
trade and still make a profit. 
It is highly debatable whether or not A&P raised 
their prices in other areas to recoup the losses in areas 
attempting to increase or maintain their sales volume. It 
(l)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.666 
(2)Ibid.,p.642 (3)Address by W.H.Albers,Pres. of Albers Supermarkets, to N.Y. 
Chapter,Am. Marketing soc. ,oct .28,1949 
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is true that prices were ~igher, but they were not above the 
normal prices for the region. A&P could not boost their 
prices above those of their competitors without sufferi.rg a 
loss in sales. However , the profits from the stores which 
did not operate in the red were used to make up for the losses 
suffered in the lower margin stores. This is one of the known 
advantages of a chain store operation and has never been 
illegal. The profits in a large chain are not regarded as 
coming from single isolated operations, b.u .t . :;-:'rom aJ.l the 
company ' s activities as a whole. \Vhile certain parts of any 
integrated firm may operate at a loss on paper, it is the 
over-all profits that count. 
Once P&P has made its profits, mainly through the 
actual sale of merchandise since this is the biggest source 
of income, they are allocated to the various stores to cover 
operating expenses. ~ profits, it is meant to be the pr-ofits 
accrueing from total activities before retailing expenses have 
been deducted and does not represent a net profit figure. 
Even the government does not argue with this system of 
allocation and states that the spread between the cost to 
M:P of merchandise and the invoice price to the retail stores 
was a paper profit which eventually went to reduce the costs 
of the products when allocated by a fair method based upon 
use employed by the retail stores. The government goes further 
to state that no question is raised as to the fairness of the 
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method of allocation of the accumulated profits and allow-
ances; when made, they have the effect of reducing the cost 
of merchandise sold to the retail stores. (1) Thus, it can 
be seen .that .~P can lower prices to meet competition, and 
that it can allocate its profits to the various stores on 
a fair basis. 
This is only one side of the picture. The rotten 
thread again makes its appearance. The government states 
that the chain store has so utilized its power and integration 
as to unreasonably restrain commerce. They say that- this is 
more than meeting competition, more than price cutting, more 
than coming to pri·ces on even terms with COi1lpeti tors. It 
means that their integrated industrial effort has been such 
that A&P must have overstepped the line by injecting into their 
competitive methods and into their integrated competitive 
power, illegal factors of such importance as to taint the 
entire operation. (2) At a later date, in reference to the 
allocation of profits to the retail stores, the court said 
that it is the predatory method through which this accumu-
lation of profits and allowances was obtained and that the 
allocation of these profits was not chall.enged.. I t added 
that with this large fund accumulated at the buying and supply-
ing level and allocated to the advantage of low cost of 
(l)U.s.v.Great A&P Tea co. ,7th Cir.ct~A:P:P.eaJ:.s 1~o.922l,pp.7-8 (2)U. s . v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp .626,p.643 
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merchandise to the retail and selling level, A&P' s enormous 
power or advantage over competitors emerges more clearly. (l) 
I t has been sho~vn that the profits from Acco, from 
t he discounts obtained, and from the various allowances such 
as advertising and bags and labels, all have had an illegal 
air. These allowances were obtained because A&P was large 
enough to have t he power to receive preferential t reatment 
from their sellers. The suplliers did not want to lose the 
patronage of such a big customer . It is only natural that 
A&P would want to buy merchandise at the lowest price poss-
ible, but in doing so, the Robinson-Patman Act has been viol-
ated on various counts such as brokerage allowances, advert-
ising allowances, and preferential discounts which were not 
offered on proportionately equal terms to other competing 
buyers . 
Since part of the profits that are being used by 
A&P in financing its low price retail operations are illegal , 
then A&P has an unfair advantage over its competitors in the 
retail field . Therefore, since .M:.P has the power to cause 
supp2iers and others to give it illegal profits to finance 
a sharp competitive action, it is restraining trade through 
the use of means not o en to other retailers . I f these 
profits were not ille:al , then the monopoly charge ~ainst 
(l)U. S. v.Great P.&P Tea Co.,7th Cir .. Ct.Appeals ,No .9221 ,p.8 
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A&P would lose most of their strength. 
Effects of the Retailipg Program 
The government states that as a result of the 
coercing and receiving of unlawful buying references, A&P 
ad become enabled to and has regularly undersold , regularl~ 
taken patronage awa:y from, and sometimes eliminated com etin,g 
retailers who have bought in substantial compl iance with 
applicable Federal laws prohibiting the sale of merchandise 
on dis criminator,y terms. I t has j ust been shown above that 
A&P has not always complied with the l aw and that they have 
had preferential treatment in their purchasing ~ As a result 
of this treatment , they can undersell some competitors and 
take away business from them. The court cited exam les o:f 
the effects of A&P' s competition and gave as a ty· ical one, 
the case of a Mr. Clark in Dallas , Texas , the ov11ner of an 
independent combination store one-half bl ock from an A&P 
store ~ (1 ) He testified that A&P ' s low prices were about 
one percent above his cost on national brands . His sales 
declined from $95 7000 in 1938 to $75, 000 i n 1941, net i nco e 
falling to $1 , 350 in 1941 ; in 1942 , he went into rece iver-
ship . A&P had closed i t s store near hi m prior to the re-
ceivership , but had opened a super market four and one-half 
blocks away . Clark testified that his credit losses which 
amounted to one-half of one percent of his sales were not 
( l)U. S. v .Great P&P Tea Co.,67 Fed . Supp.626 ,pp . 667-668 
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the cause of his failure. At this same time, A&P stores in 
Dallas were in a competitive fight with Safeway with price 
reductions being made on both sides. (1) 
The owner of a Clover Farm Store in another area 
said that A&P ' s advertised prices were below his cost and 
that he was constantly losing business . However, the A&P 
store next door to his moved away and immediately business 
pi cked up to its fo rmer sales figure. ( 2) But the use of 
such cases can be confusing and it is difficult to determine 
if A&P competition was the real factor that threatened these 
independent stores . A large chain has a definate buying ad-
vantage through quantity discounts which are available to all . 
I t reduces many of the middlemen costs that mean higher prices 
for the independent . It can also be safely said that its 
greater operating efficiency and its lower expense rates 
contribute towards lower pr ices. (3) On the other side of 
the picture, the court does not show whether the independent 
stores were efficiently run , whether they bought wisely, or 
what sort of a j ob they did on merchandis ing and promotion. 
Merely to say that stores failed because of M.P' s low prices 
is too general and other factors may be involved. 
It is also contended by the court that A&P has 
(l) U.S. v .Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed .Supp.626,p.667 
(2)Ibid.,p.668 (3)See pages 67 and 68 of this chapter 
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frustrated the application of various State Ivlinimum 1\~arkup 
Laws to their retailing of products manufactured in their 
ov10 plants by underbilling such products to their retailing 
subsidiaries in states where such laws are in effect. This 
has already been discussed in this chapter. (1) The bill-
ing of merchandise to the retail stores from the manufact-
uring subsidiaries is merely a bookkeeping transaction and 
M P could set any price it wanted to above cost when it put 
the goods into the retail store inventories. The real cost 
of the goods was that of the cost of production plus distri-
bution to the various stores. A&P did not sell the goods 
below the cost of replacement and this was made a company 
policy. (2) 
The final effect claimed by the court is that by 
extending their horizontal expansion of retail operations 
under centralized control into forty states, M.P has been 
enabled to, and has, without reducing their overall profit 
levels, successively focussed their dominant and unfairly 
secured retailing advantage upon particualr selected areas 
in the form of arbitrarily low and often sub-cost operations 
and have thereby imposed and are now imposing upon compet-
ing retailers in such successively attacked areas unreason-
able hardships not produced by normal competitive forces. 
\ l)See p~es 59 to 61 of this chapter. 
(2)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.675 
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A&P has had a policy of cutting prices as low as 
possible in areas where there is a serious competitive pict-
ure or where they are losing volume. The court has pointed 
out many instances where various units or entire divisions 
have operated many stores in the red. (1) I n 1935,it was 
the middle western Division; 1937, the Easter.n Division; 1934-
1940, the New England Division. Various units all over the 
country had stores operating at a loss at times from 1930 
to 1941. 
But _just how important was this threat of compet-
ition to the competing retailers? Nat ional cash Register 
offers findings to the effect that the two major causes for 
business failures in the retail field are lack of capital, 
accounting for 34.9% of the failures, and incompetence or 
poor man~ement accounting for 34.5% of the failures. Only 
2.4% of those failing in the United States went out of bus-
iness because of competition. (2) In a report put out by 
the Department of Commerce, it was stated that, from an 
analysis of a group of questionnaires sent out to grocers 
who were having difficulty competing with the supermarkets, 
it was concluded that most of the grocers were not being 
defeated by supermarket competition, but by their lack of 
understanding .of the real reasons for supermarket success . (3) 
(l)U. S. v .Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp . 626 , pp.665-671 {2)National cash Register Co. VBetter Retailing11 ,(1947)p.5 (3) Small Bus.Aids, 11 Meeting Supermarket Competi tionrr ,No . 24 · 
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I t can be said, in conclusion, that AB(P does have 
an unfair advantage over its competitors in that it has the 
use of funds Which have been obtained on an illegal basis. 
Furthermore, these funds make some contribution to a ~ow 
price policy that allows A&P to give some stiff competition 
to the trade. These facts cannot be denied, but whether or 
not they constitute a serious threat to restraint of trade 
and runount to a partial monopoly is another question. This 
problem will be discussed in the concluding chapter and the 
factors that do or do not contribute to a monopoly will be 
discussed and appraised. 
Justice Department Demands 
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
asks that the court order the separation of A&P 1s retai~ 
business into seven separate parts, each part to consist of 
the warehouses and retail stores comprising each of the 
seven existing divisions; and that the ownership , control, 
man~ement, and direction of each of the seven divisions be 
completely and perpetually separated from the ownership, 
control, management, and direction of those who own and 
control A&P's manufacturing and processing business. It 
also asks that the various manufacturing subsidiaries be 
made separate from each other. 
If the court should grant this remedy, there would 
be seven separate regional chains. The basis for the new 
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orgro1ization already exists and the new chains will still 
be of a good size. Chains of smaller size operate just as 
efficiently and at as low prices as the present A&P. Stop 
and Shop in I~ssachusetts, Food Fair in Phi ladelphia, or 
Fisher Br os. i n Cl eveland are good examples . If the newly 
created chains can organize their centr al buying departments 
on a similar effic ient basis , there is no reason why they 
could not succeed. 
8 2 
Chapter v 
CONCLUSIONS ON TEE CASE 
Monopoly 
The courts can on~ come to one of two decisions 
in the present case against A&P: either its actions are 
serious enough in the aggregate to constitute a monopoly, 
or its operations are more competitive than monopolistic 
and the company i s innocent. There can be no doubt that 
A&P has broken the law at various times, especially under 
the Robinson-Patman Act. Do all these various illegal acts 
show that A&P is restraining trade and follovdng monopol-
istic practices when the acts are considered as a whole? 
To answer this question, it m~ht be best to determine what 
type of monopoly A&P would be i f t he Department of Justice ' s 
allegations are t r ue. 
The sever al economic definitions of a monopoly 
boil down to a greatly simplified statement that it is the 
ability on the part of the seller or buyer to regulate and 
control his prices so as to maximize his profits. It has 
been claimed that the usual characteristic of a monopoly is 
that it will restrict output in order to raise prices. ( lJ 
In other words, the monopoly creates an artificial scarcity 
so that it -can ask the highest r easonable price which will 
(l)I!JI. A. Adelman, "The .A&P Case" ,Quarterly Journal of Economic s 
May , l949,p.241 
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give the greatest return in profits. This implies that 
another characteristic is that of high price. It is true 
that these various factors fit the usual char.ges brought 
against monopolies by the government, but to accept such a 
limited definition is to ignore another important side of 
the picture. 
It has been argued that because A&P lowers prices, 
attempts to increase the volume of goods handled to as large 
a figure as possible, and eng~es in strong competitive action, 
that it does not meet the requirements of a real monopoly. 
<.1) But, if through the advantage of illegally obtained 
allowances and practices, A&P is able to cut prices so low 
that competition is driven out because they cannot meet the 
prices throqgh fair means under any circumstances, then A&P 
would be a monopoly . The tremendous increasing volume of 
goods handled at these low prices enables A&P to capture an 
increasingly large percentage of the market. As its share 
of the market grows lar,ger, its profits increase with the · 
percentage of expenses to sales decreasing . Thus, the comp-
any is maximizing its profits and the ability to do this 
results from the power to lower prices through illegal 
concessions and practices. The origional simplified def-
inition of' a monopoly fits this picture. The court in the 
pre sent case charges that A&.P was able to eliminate its 
(lJ Ni..A. Adelman,ilThe A&P Case", Quarter~ J ournal. of' Econ. 
May,l949,p.241 
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competitors and restrain trade through its practices. The 
question now is whether these practices are really monopol-
istic or the result of strenuous competition that is, on 
the whole, legal. 
The Government ' s Attitude Towards MonopolY 
To get the clearest idea of what the government is 
aiming for when it decided to take action against A&P, it is 
best to examine the philosophy that is underlying the think-
ing of both the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice and the present political administration. Trust 
Busting was first made possible under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890 and since then has been augmented by the setting 
up of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914, and the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936. The type of enforcement and the amount 
.of it usually depends on how the particular political admin-
istration feels on the subject of business practices at the 
time it is in office . 
Vfuen the Democratic Party came into power in 1932, 
it was known that President Roosevelt was against concent-
rations of pr-ivate power. The pressure was not really put 
on until 1938 when Thurman Arnold was appointed Attorney 
General. The number of' anti trust cases jumped :from eleven 
i n the year when he took charge to over ninety in both 1941 
and 1942 . Appropriations to the Antitrust Division also 
i ncreased. II.IJr. Arnmld has summed up the government ' s attitude 
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towards business i n his book entitled, "Bottlenecks in 
Business". ( 1) 
I n the chapter entitled, "The Test is Efficiency 
and Service", rvrr. Arnold s tates that free markets do not 
maintai n t hemselves . The very essence of competition con-
s ists of getting the better of the other fellow. Great 
organizations start by being more efficient. They get i nto 
power and it is inevitable that they will use this power to 
protect themselves against the new crop of independent enter-
prises whi ch may be pushing them against the wall in the 
competitive struggle. A referee is always necessary in the 
competitive game--- . The maintenance of a free market is as 
much a matter of constant policing as the flow of free 
traffic at a busy intersection. (2) He adds that it is not 
size in itself that t hey want to destroy , but the use of 
organized power to restrain trade increasingly, without 
justification, in terms mf greater distribution of goods. 
Therefore, he says that there is only one test that can be 
applied to the privilage of organization and that is this : 
Does it increase the efficiency of production and distrib-
ution and pass the saving on to the consumer? He claims that 
this test means that the J ustice Department should s~ to 
every business enterprise that it can grow as big as it can, 
(1) Thurman Arnold, "Bottlenecks in Business", (Reynal and 
Hitchcock,New York,l940) 
( 2) Ibid ., p . l24 
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providing that it can justify the extent of its organized 
power by showing that it contributes to the efficiency of 
mass production and distribution. The Department will 
protect it against organized groups of small business 
which attempt to prvent it from giving cheaper goods to 
the public. Arnold says that on the other hand, a business , 
will be attacked if it seeks to maintain its system of 
distribution by usi~ its orgainized power to prevent exper-
imental developments by others either in production or in 
distribution or in price policies . Size in itself is not 
an evil, but it does give po\'lrer to those who control it .. 
That power must be c onstantly watched by an adequate enforce-
ment agency to see that it does not destroy a free market. (1) 
I n a report f rom the Economic Consultant of the 
Antitrust Division, it was pointed out that public action 
about food prices was needed because a large part of the 
American people cannot afford an ~equate diet at the present 
prices . ( 2) The report states that many areas of food 
processing and distribution are under the effective control 
of a few large enterprises and within the last generation, 
the growth of some of these concerns in size and power has 
been unmatched in other American industries. (3) On the 
other hand, they i ncrease the unbalance of the American 
(l)Thurman Arnold, "Bottlenecks in Business " ,p.l25 
(2)Ibid. , p . 225 
(3) Ibid• ,p.229 
Economic System by driving prices dovm and thus nullify in 
part the government 's effort to bring farm incomes back to 
parity. On the other hand, they impair the American 
standard of living .by raising food prices to the consumers. (1) 
Just how does this apply to a firm such as A&P? 
It is true that P&P did come into power by being a large, 
efficient,integrated firm, and it is also true that MP wants 
to protect its position by keeping prices low enough to 
gain a certain share of a market area. But in answer to the 
question as to whetherA&P increases the efficiency of product-
ion and distribution and passes the savings on to the 
consumer, there might be some debate. M P does charge low 
prices and keeps them low on an over-all average. This test 
question that~~. ~ld. cansidered so important was not 
answered by the courts except to say that to buy, sell, and 
distribute to a substantial portion of 130,000 ,000 :people, 
$1,750,000,000 worth of food annually at a profit of 1~ 
cents on each dollar is an achievment that one may well be 
proud of. (2) 
I t is undeniable that MP has power along with its 
size. The present case has been brought up because this power 
has been abused and therefore, even though A&P does pass 
savings on to the consumers, it is not important. .A&P is one 
(l)Thurman Arnold, "Bottlenecks in Businessn,p.231 
(2)U.S.v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.676 
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of those firms that has grovm to a large size in the food 
industry, but j ust how .much control it has is a question 
that not even the courts have eff ectively answered. The 
company has probably contributed quite a bit to the forcing 
down of farm prices, but the deviation to t he formula set 
up by 1~, Arnold lies in the fact the A&P does not charge 
high prices to the consumer . 
But the Justice Department has gotten around this 
barrier of low f ood prices. J.Howard McGrath has given what 
he believes to be the correct viewpoint on food prices in 
relati n to A&P. He has stated that the A&P deci sion should 
result in lower food pri ces for over 90% of the public who 
buy from other grocers who, because of A&P ' practices, are 
required to purchase their supplies at a higher price. (1 ) 
IVIr . McGrath says that we have only to look at the number of 
small busi nesses that fade out of t he picture to under stand 
why the government must step in to protect them. (2) ~~. 
McGrath does not take into account t hat just as many business~s 
open every year to take their places and that t he major cause 
of their failur e is bad management . He adds that he doe s 
not believe that it would be desirable to put down a specific 
code f or business t o follow so that it could b e sure of the 
interpretation of the law. But he does agre e t hat trere 
(l )J .Howard McGrath, "Bigness I tself No Crime" , u. S. News,Nov . 25, 
1949 ,p.29 
( 2) I bid . ,p. 28 
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should be a g ener al understanding of what the l aw means 
and that i t i s s tated in the law. ( 1) I n ref'erence to the 
actual charg es agai nst .A&P, he states that ef fi ciency is not 
a defense for viola tion of the law. Greater efficiency re-
sults from the impetus of competi tion. If A&P produces 
those lower prices by illegal practices , then it makes no 
di f fer ence how effi cient t hey are . ( 2 ) He adds that it 
is not the fact of s ize , but the way size is used that is 
of concern in the A&P Case . ( 3 ) 
The present administration has made much of t he 
fact that industry is concentrat ed in t he hands of a few 
large firms . I t has been continual ly anti-big busines s and 
has brought about an increasing number of suits agai nst 
large firms through the Department of J ustice .. Nearly all 
of these cases have concerned companies who have probabJ.y 
been guilty of violating the antitrust l aws in one wey or 
another, but mainly through control of the market . (4) 
The courts have played a strong part in the fight against 
monopolistic practices in business and the attitudes of the 
courts have taken on an i ncreasing similarity to those of 
the administration. Appointees to the bench a re usually 
( l )J".Howard McGrath, "Bigness I tself No Cr i me " ,u.s.News,Nov. 25, 
l949,p . 29 
( 2 ) Ibid . ' p. 29 
( 3) I bid.,p.26 
(4) Schine Theatres, I nc . v .U. S. 7334 U.s·;lJ.O( l948) ; American 
Tobacco Co . v.u.s., 328 U.S.781(1946), etc . 
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those who conform pretty much to the pattern set do\vn by 
~he administration. Chief J ustice Vinson and former Attorney 
GeneralTom Clark are two examples of the ability of the 
· government to put in men syrrqJathetic to the ideals of the 
political party in power. Of particular interest to the 
present _f:J&p case is the fact the Judge Walter c.Lindley of 
the I llinois District Court has been appointed to the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, while Judge Sherman Minton 
has been appointed to the Supreme Court. These are the two 
judges who have previously tried N(P. With the power of 
appointment in the hands of the President, he has the 
opportunity to determine the trend and character of future 
decisions by nominating judges that qgree with the ideolog-
ical and economic principles of the administration. I:f the 
A&P case should reach the supreme court , it could be argued 
that the attitude of the judges would not be as objective 
as it should be and that rather than serving as a check on 
the administrative branch of the government ,. it is an ally . 
But, while it is true that the supreme Court and also the 
lesser courts have been filled with appointees sympathetic 
to the present political party, it is doubtfUl whether bias 
will play a part in the determining of the guilt of A&P . 
Vagueness of the La!§ 
Business men have for years complained of the vague 
and indefinate wording of our anti trust laws . Re cently, . the 
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Committee for Economic Development recomeruied that the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, the Atiller-T,ydings Amendment , ClaYton 
Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Robinson-Patmm1 
Act be re-examined and recast into a consistant body of 
legislation that clarifies objectives and represents the 
application of reasonable ]principles and methods to further 
these objectives. They further state that the laws govern-
ing competition are complex and confused and sometimes 
inconsistent and even contradictory. The business man f'inds 
it practically impossible at times to obtain a clear 
understanding of what he or his competitior mey , or mey not, 
legally do. (l) It can also be argued that this vagueness 
is unavoidable and that the antitrust violations cannot be 
def ined precisely, but that each case must be interpreted by 
the courts on its own merits . (2) 
The lack of definate understanding leads to 
interpretations of the laws that comform to the ideologies 
of the political administration in power at a particular 
time . At the present time, it has been commented that the 
Sherman Antitrust Act is subject to two interpretations : 
the first is a. familiar classical one ~ainst attempts to 
gain a definate monopoly, and the other arises out of the 
) 
attitude of the present government towards the concentration 
(l) Conunittee f or Ecoh. Dev., "Meeting Special Probs• of small 
Business" ,June,l947,p.48 (2)Business, "Defense Arguments",Newsweek,Aug.22,1949 
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of business ~!d industry in the hands of a few large fi rms . 
( 1) The pending action against DuPont and .M.P are t wo 
examples of the suits against large firms who control a 
s izable share of the markets in which they do business, but 
who seemingly attempt t o pass on the savings of their oper-
ations to the consumers . I t is entirely possible that the 
large size of t hese may make them burdensome on competition 
but if their size i s the result of efficiency, the govern-
ment would be unjus t ly punishing them. The Jus tice Depart.-
ment is seeki ng t o pr ove t hat it is not efficiency but unfair 
conpe:tit.ive actions that g ive them their advant age. 
In rebuttal to this argument that many firms are 
the victim of changing ,i nterpretations and indefinate word-
ings of the antitrust laws , J udge Lindley ,of the I llinois 
Court, who first found Jl&P guilty, said that more comprehen-
sive language than that found in the Sherman Act was diffi-
cult to conceiv~. (1 ) I t i s his belief that t he Sherman 
Act could cover most of the major violations of competitive 
freedom, and that too often, a new law is enacted to cure the 
mal- administration of an old one . He admi tl3 that much of 
t he legislation passed after the Sherman Antitrust Law has 
had an elusive uncertainty and that it is difficult for the 
business man to steer a course that w.tll ~ conform exactly to 
all the l aws . However, the case is being t ried only on 
(l) U. s . v .Great A&.P Tea Co. ,67 Fed. Supp . 626 , p . 677 
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violations of the Sherman Act and the conf'u.sion of' other 
legislation need not be considered. one point at which this 
argument breaks down is that there is no definition of' the 
area in which a firm goes from the violation of a partic-
ular law against specific practices, to the point at which it 
could be called a monopoly. It is not clear where the div-
iding line between the breaking of ~a ··law and a monopoly is 
drawn, and also, how many specific violations have to be 
made before a firm becomes a monopoly . This question is 
probably impossible to answer in general terms , but it does 
show that a company could be a monopoly without realizing it 
if the court decided to i .nterpret the over-all effect of the 
firm ' s actions.as such. 
Another rebuttal argument against the vagueness of 
the laws might be that some firms deliberately Gla~ ~his 
indefinate factor as an excuse for not knpwi.og tp~~- -~hey 
- were operating illegally at some point . It was suggested 
throughout the case against .M:.P in I llinois that the chain 
must.have been conscious that it was violating the law, 
othervdse , it could not have made certain statements nor 
i d .d (1) Business"men hate to give up practices acted as t 1. • 
whic~ bring in good returns and are beneficial to their firms 
when those practices are declared illegal. They will attempt 
(l)U. s . v.Great MP Tea Co. ,67 Fed.Supp.626,p .. 626-680 
) 
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to hold·on to t hem in one fo rm or another, hoping that be-
cause the laws are not clear , they can get away with it by 
making slight changes . An example of this appeared when 
A&P attempted to cir cumvent the brokerage provisions of the 
Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 by inducing suppliers to make 
reductions to the amount of the brokerage fee instead of 
giving a. regular cash f ee . The collection of brokerage in 
any form by a buyer f or his own retail outlets was declared 
illegal. 
Lobbies I nf luencing the Governrnent 
Brokers, Wholes~ers, and retailers all have good 
reason for wanting A&P and other chains restricted and con-
trolled. The large chains do not like to pay brokerage fees 
when they do their own buying. This means that the chaino 
do not like to pay extra for food and food products so that 
the producer and seller can pocket money tha·t he would norm-
ally have t o pay to broker s who arrange the sales t r ansactions 
between hi m and stores other than t he chains.. To get around 
this problem of having an unecessary broker age fee loaded on 
to the price of goods, the chains either t ry to get discounts 
or buy direct from firms who do not use brokers at all. Thi s 
makes it hard on t he broker and his transactj_ons and commissions 
f a l l off. · Then he feels that he has been dealt with unj ustly 
and he raises his voice in protest because the chains are not 
buying through him. 
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The s ame situation exists through independent 
wholesalers. They have been circwnvented by chains who do 
their own warehousing and :bi general perform the same functions 
that the wholesalers do. rt · is only natural that they try 
to protect their position in the face of dE~clining volwne, 
so they,too, protest. 
The retailers, who are in competition with the 
chains, find that they cannot keep up, that they are being 
undersold, and that sales are falling off. Their typical 
reaction is to object strenuously and urge that something 
be done about the chains before independent business is 
completely destroyed. To support their cause, certain 
politicions have come to their aid and they actively camp-
aign against the chains probably because it is a good issue 
to present to the voters and it will assist them at the 
next . election to have the independent business men solidly 
behind them. On the other hand, it is highly possible that 
some members of the political administration of either state 
or national governments are sincerely motivated by a situation 
that they believe needs to be corrected. The chains do 
have an advantage in their size and it is possible that 
some of them may be throwing a little weight around and 
gaining advanatges in prices and operations that are illegal 
and unavailable to all retailers. 
The chains have shown themselves tc::J be a threat to 
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the corner store independent almost :from their start in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1870, the 
Ame rican Grocer's Mqgazin denounced the practices of A&P 
and called for a halt to the growth of the chain. ( 1) 
Pro tests have continued and as the independents became more 
organi zed , their protests carried more weight. In J une of 
1932, the l\fational Association of Retail Grocers appro -
riated money for the fight to prove that A&P was a monopoly. 
(2) Again in 1949 at t eir national convention, the Assoc-
iation demanded that the A&P chain be broken up. (3) A 
powerful lobby such as the N-ational Association of Retail 
Grocers can exert a lot of influence through its represent-
ation of thousands of independent retail grocers. It has been 
an enemy of the chains for years and has been instrumental in 
affecting local chain store taxes. 
Represent ative vr~ht Patman has been another arch-
f oe of the chain stores. He has at several times introduced 
legislation desinged to cur b the power of the chains such as 
the Robinson-Patman Act and the chain store tax bill of 1938 
that would have destroyed any chain of over 5v0 stores. Small 
business lobbies have also preached that th(~ American way of 
life must be preserved through the protection of inde endent 
( l )Roy J.Bullock, "History of the Great .A&.P Co ." Harvard Bus. 
Review, Vol .XI : Apr.l933,p.293 -
(2) 11Grocers Call M P a Monopoly",Bus.·week, ~rune 22,1932 7p.8 (3) 11 'I'he Crime of Efficiency"N.Y.Herald Tribtme, sept.l7,l949 
- ' 
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business men and that if the nation isn 't careful, big 
business will take over everything and do away with the 
opportunity for a ~ to go into business for himself. 
The present administration has been sympathetic 
to these various pressures. In a recent discussion of a 
report made by secretary of Commerce sawyer, it was said that 
the government was adverse to the conditions that allowed 
a veryfew companies to control almost an •:lntire industry. 
(1) The Democratic Party advocates free enterprise and pro-
tection of the small business man even though it may be 
necessar,y to give up the low prices offered by the lar.ge 
concerns today. (2) With the pressures of wholesalers, 
brokers, retailers, and platform promises behind them, the 
Department of Justice has brought · suit against M.P s everal 
times but without any severely damaging results. The 
government now feel s that the only way that .A&.P can be stopped 
is to break it up. This is just what the lobbies would 
like to see. Also, if the Antitrust Division succeeds, it 
may possibly give them a chance to fUrther carry on their 
program of protecting free enterprise by prosecuting other 
chains along . the same pattern as that brought against .MP. 
( 1.) David Lawrence, "Today in washington", washington Star, 
Dec.7,1949 ( 2)J-.Howard McGrath, "Bigness Itself liTo Crime", U.s. News, 
Nov.25,1949,p.28 
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Size or Efficiencx 
In the nationwide newspaper discussion of the 
A&P Case, it is of ten pointed out that the government is 
after A&:P simply because i t is big. The government has 
stated that it is not prosecuting A&P for bigness, but 
the court added that size i n itself is an earmark of monop-
oly power, f or size carrie s with it an opportunity to abuse . 
(l) I t is the abuse of power that the court is primarily 
interested in. A&P, on the other hand, claims that they 
achieved t heir top position in the chain grocery field 
through efficient operation and not through abuses of the law 
and restraint of trade. The big question is whether A&P 
dominates the trade though its use of power rising out of 
size to obtain unfair advantages and to restrict competition, 
or whether it achieved its success mainly through modern 
and efficient retailing methods . 
Trends in Retai!iBg 
Illarketing costs in relation to production costs 
have been increasing steadily . This may be because product-
ion costs have been going down because of increased efficiency , 
but it also indicates that there has been no comparable 
increase in the effi ciency of the di st ribution process . In 
i939, one authority estimated that marketing costs were about 
~ l)U . S . v.Great A&P Tea Co . , ? th Cir.ct.Appeals , No .922l,p.9 
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fifty percent of the total costs of oroduction and market-
. . . 
ing. (1) Anyone who can successful~reduce the cost s of 
distribution will be able to sell his products at a lower 
price than his competitors and generally move a larger vol-
ume . 
Several factors contribute to the higher percent-
age of distribution costs, such as increases in advertising, 
mor e services offered, higher transportation costs f or longer 
shipping dist&~ces, increased personnel, expensive equipment 
and fixtures, and various wastes in marketing. The se wastes 
result from three factors : poor management, lack of pr oper 
marketing information, and compet.i tion. In competition 
the r e may be duplication of effort, or the biggest advertiser, 
though more i nefficient, may outsell his competitor . ( 2) 
J-ust recently, the chai rman of the House Agricultural Comm-
ittee s t ated that there was a great waste in the large city 
markets . He gave as an example :New York Ci ty which was 
pointed out as having t he most antiquated, crowded , and in-
efficient ·marketing f acilities in theUni ted States . Nearly 
50% out of every dollar paid by New York housewives goes to 
pay t he handling and distribution charges for products 
after they arrive in Jersey City or Hoboken. The same 
situation is duplicated to a smaller extent in other large 
(l) Converse & Huegy , "Elements of Marketing" , (New York , 
Prenti ce-Hall,l946) p.5 
( 2) I bid. , p.l4 
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cities in the country which constitute the greater marketing 
areas. One way suggested for reducing the food bills of the 
consumers was to bring the city market up to date . (1 
o do away wi th the se unecessary distribution costs 
that can be avoided, many of the chain stores have develo ed 
a method of i ntegrated operations that allow them to perform 
most of the functions connected with the distribution of food 
at a l ower cost than through the usual re lar channels. 
As a result of the savings of integrated buying and manufact-
uring, such chains as At:P can sell their products at a lower 
costthan retailers who go through brokers , whol esalers,and 
other middlemen. 
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I t soon became apparent to the independents that 
t he chains could easily undersell them , and they fought back 
to maintain their business . Many of the independents failed 
to realize that th~y had t o change their methods of operation; 
and only complained of the unfair compe tition. Others de-
cided that the only way to combat the rising tide of the 
chains was to adopt their methods. One way of doing this was 
by organizing into voluntary and cooperative retail store 
groups so that they coul d have the same buying advanatges a s 
the chains. The wholesalers have also been able to protect 
(1) 11 Food Markets Held Wastef ul" ,Boston Herald, Dec. l0 , 1949 
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their positio~ by eng~ing in the voluntary chains with 
retailers. As a result, there has been a rising trend of 
both cooperative and voluntary chains so that tod~ there 
are four times as many stores in these groups than are in all 
the grocery store chains in the country. (1) Thus, the 
trend has been to follow the chain store movement towards 
the elimination of many of the wastes of distribution and 
lower prices to the consumer. Those independent stores that 
do not follow are naturalqat a disadvant~e. But many of 
them feel that their only recourse is to prohibit the 
large chains from gaining any advantage through their buying 
power. ThroQgh their lobbies such as the National Association 
of Retail Grocers, the independents can make their voice 
heard in protest to progressive changes, and they argue that 
tbe big buyers are monopolistic since the small store is 
forced out of business . 
Another trend that is helpi~the independent to 
compete with the chains is that of increased supermarket 
operations. The independents have set up individual 
supermarkets which adopt all the new methods used by the 
chains such a s mass merchandising , planned locations, and 
self service , so that they are able to compete on an equal 
and often superior basis. The independent doesn ' t have to 
(1) "Voluntaries and coops have More Volume than Corporate 
Chains", Voluntary: & coo12e~ative Magazi:q.e,Dec.l949,p.49 
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search out suppliers that are capable of supplying a h~e 
chain operation so that his sources of supply are not as 
restricted , and he can take advantage of better buys in 
smaller quantities than the chains could make use of. Even 
the small independents are learning lessons from the chains 
and adoP,ting more modern methods, cleaning up their stores, 
buying through large groups , and buying wisely. 
As a result of .adopting the newer and more modern 
marketing methods, the indpendents can compete on a more 
equal basis with the chains. Prices are being forced down 
to lower levels than would ordinarily be offered under the 
old methods of opera.tion, and the consumer benefits . .M.P 
has been a leader in many of the innovations even though it 
was l ate in adopting the supermarket idea. But as a result 
of increased competition, its share of · the market is being 
threatened and it is obliged to resort to the keenest of 
competitive methods . Caught between the rising tide of 
independent competition and that of the chains, the unprog-
ressive retailer is finding himself squeezed out . The blame 
has to be put on someone. This again brings up the important 
question: Is A&P to blame for the squeezing out of the 
independent through the illegal use of its power resulting 
from size, or does M P take advantage of all the more efficient 
operating methods that are available to all retailers and thus 
achieve its tremendous sales volume because of a more 
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progressive approach to the selling of food to the consumer? 
Efficiency v. Size 
The J ustice Department and the courts have constantly 
repeated that they are not trying A&P on size alone. Juqge 
Lindley stated that the Antitrust Act was not intended to 
prevent normal expansion of business. It offers no objection 
to the mere size of a co~oration or to the continued exertion 
of its lawful power, when that size and power have been obtained 
by lawful means and developed by natural growth , although its 
resources, capital, stre~th, and power may give to such a 
corperation a dominating place in the business or industry with 
which it is concerned. It is entitled to maintain its size 
and the power that legiti mately goes with it provided that 
no law has been transgressed in obtaining it . (1) 
The main charge against M P comems discriminatory 
price preferences . The low retail prices are based on these 
preferences and allow A&P to undersell its competitors . Thus, 
most of the charges against the retailing activities of A&P 
are really based on preferential prices and allowances . There 
are t wo ways by which A&P could have obtained these preferences : 
either through vigerous competit:i.on or by monopoly . To 
determine which of these 'would be the more important factor, 
it would pay to look at the type of sellers and suppliers 
(1 U.S~ v.Great A&P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p.644 
that P&P buys from. First , none of' the trials make any mention 
of discrimination off ered by the small sellers. The unit 
bu ers or the store managers usually did this type of' buying 
• and it was mostly local produce. Therefore, all the buying 
which figured in the case was done by the larger purchasing 
units such as Headquarters, Acco, or other National Subsid-
iaries. The majority of' those suppliers that M.P bought from 
had to be large since the chain needs an extremely large 
amount of any par ticular food product to stock all its retai~ 
stores . Small producers would not be able to supply eno~h 
merchandise individually of any particular brabd. Therefore, 
i t is generally a system of' large buying agencies obtaining 
food products from ~arge suppliers. The same thing holds 
t r ue for produce purchasing. rruch of it is done from large 
cooperatives or big produce farmer s who can collect together 
large quantities of f ruit s and vegetables. Another sour ce 
~05 
is the big market tnat deals in car~oads rather than small lots. 
~~y do these l arge suppliers g i ve conces sions to 
.A&P? 'l'heir s ize would seem to indicat e that they could se~l 
to many markets, not just to MP alone. such COlli>anies as 
Canada Dry, Ralston Purina,J"ello, and Campbell all have a 
nationwide distribution with their products in almost every 
type of' retail store. The same holds true of' the big fruit 
cooperatives on the west coast. They could very easily have 
told A&P that they were not interested in handing out aqy 
extra price concessions , and it is doubtful whether they 
would have lost any great proportion of their business . 
Yet, .A&P is a big customer. The goods they buy mean added 
volume to the suppliers and a l ower percentage of expense . 
Rather than see someone else get the trade of A&P, they 
would probably seek the business even though it m~ht mean 
selling the merchandise at a slightly lower price . I t is also 
highly possible that these same l ow prices are not offered to 
everyone unless another buyer hears of the situation and is of 
sufficient size to make himself heard. Then he, too , could 
obtain the same concessions. The court did not al low as evid-
ence the fact that many others were receiving the same types 
ofdiscounts that A&P was receiving , but they did recognize 
that many did not receive the discounts . (1) Therefore, it 
would seem that while P~P did r eceive discriminatory discounts, 
that on the whole, they were not the result of extreme 
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pressure combined with ~hreats to boycott and blacklist the 
suppliers . The lar,ge suppliers were motivated more by compet itive 
forces and the desire to hold on to a large account that 
knew it could obtain t he goods cheaper from some other 
source . The pressure was more i n the nature of' bargaining 
t han of a monopolistic nature. 
But, t he fact s till stands that bot h M P and the 
(l)U.s.v .Great A&P Tea co . , 7th Cir. ct.Appeals,No .922l,p.l0 
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suppliers wer e breaking the l aw. Even though the pref eren-
tial prices might have arisen from more competitive forces, 
the end result has been that A&P has generally had an ad-
vantage over most af its smaller independent competitors by 
receiving reductions that are not offered to ever,yone prop-
ortionately. Whether this advantage is illegal enough to 
constitute a monopolistic force or whether it is just an 
infraction of the Robinson-Patman Act is a question that only 
the courts can decide. The lack of pressure to any great 
degree would seem to indicate that although the price dis-
criminations were illegal, they were not obtained by monop-
olistic pressure, but rather by the bargaining power of A&P 
that is of sufficient . size to make itself heard by the 
large suppliers . 
The courts now go one step further and state that 
the profits from the discriminatory prices and allowances 
are used to lower prices in the retail stores and undersell 
cop1peti tion. This would mean that even though the illegal 
preferences were not obtained through threats to boycott , 
they were used in such a fashion that retail competition was 
reduced, and therefore it gave A&P monopolistic power at the 
retail level. ·To summarize then , it can be said that A&P 
does have an advantage in bargaining power through its large 
size and purchasing capacity. This bargaining power is 
abused and illegal preferences obtained even though the 
pressure used by A&P is not what the court claims it to be . 
The resulting lower prices have an illegal factor in them and 
therefore, when used in competition, give an unfair advant e 
to A&P. This advantage is the result of ower stemming 
from size . I t is t rue that efficiency does play a very 
i mportant part in the purchasing operations of the chain, but 
the f act still stands that there has been an abuse of power 
when lV5cP accepts discriminatory discounts and all owances . 
Before deciding how serious a monopolistic threat 
this abuse of power constitutes , it might be well to examine 
another side of the picture and see that part that efficiency 
does play 8 What would the situation be if all the preferences 
were discontinued? A&P would still be one of the largest 
b ers i n the field. ouanti ty discounts for actual savings 
made would continue ·to be tremendous . The cost of handling 
the goods between the supplier and the retail store would 
also be lower since the company performs most of its own middle-
men functions . The integrated operations of th com any make 
it possible to obtain food products at a considerably lower 
price than smaller operators. The chain could still o erate 
with considerably lower prices than most independents and 
smaller chains . I t has been shovm in the previous chapter 
that the independents do not take advantage of the factors of 
efficiency that are available to them such as prompt treatment 
of di scounts , cooperative purchasing,and getting rid of 
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outmoded operational methods and thus reducing overhead. 
They also do not have the advantage of size in that ~r:.&P can 
run on a much smaller profit margin since the actual cash 
profit is large because of the tremendous volume of sales . 
Efficiency does play a very important part in the lowering 
of prices and when compared to preferential price advant~es, 
efficiency probably accounts for the majority of the r ce 
differential between ~~P and the independents. ~~ether A&P 
received the preferences or not, it would still be able to 
undersell the majority of the market. Wby,then, does A&P 
take the discounts? It is probably because they are easily 
available and the chain does not want to lose out on something 
that its large competitors will receive. Furthermore, A&P 
wants t o buy goods at the lowest price possible, and as one 
of the largest buyers in the field, it is always alert to 
savings of any sort. If it believes that the prices charged 
are too high, it trys to bargain them down. This is no 
excuse for the illegality of the discounts, but the roonop-
·olistic power behind these discounts has been over-emphasized 
while the major factor contributing to the l ow prices of A&P 
has been overlooked. 
It is doubtful whether the government is prosecuting 
A&P for bigness alone. There is a definate illegal element 
. in its operations and ·the power arising from the size of 
the chain has been abused. The J ustice Department is well 
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within its rights when i t attempts to put a stop to the 
practices which violate the law. The disput e i s not with 
the illegality of the fac tOrs , but rather whether the cum-
ul ative effect of these factors is enough to constitute a 
monopoly• J ust where the balance between efficient and 
illegal operations is tipped towards monopoly is difficult 
to sqy. If it can be shown that the effects of A&P ' s actions 
are not anywhere near as serious as the court would make them 
out to be , then it may be possible to tip the scales towards 
efficient operation rather than monopolistic power • . A study 
of the, effects of breaking up A&P would give the best idea 
of the present effect that the company has in the food market-
ing field . 
Effect s of Breakigg Up .A&P 
If the government wins its case, several marketing 
g r oups will be affected in one way or another. A&P will feel 
the g r eatest difference , but its competition among brokers, 
wholesalers, and retailers will also find that a change has 
been made that might concern them either adversly or for the 
better. The consumer may- or may not feel the change for .M.P 
claims that prices will be higher in general while the court 
claims they will be lower. 
Effects on MP 
One of the first questions to ask is will the gov-
ernment ' s plan work . The answer is probably yes . The seven 
1.1.0 
independent chains that will result from the breakup should 
b.e able to adjust themselves af'ter a period of t i me . The 
basic otgatlization has been in existence for years, and the 
managerial ability is there.. The purchasing department of 
each of the new chai ns could probably swing into action with-
out too noticable a loss of time. The . courts did not forbid 
the chains from purchasing f rom the subsidiary produ~ing 
corporations so that a source of supply has been set up for 
many of the items needed in the s tores . 
The huge manufacturi ng subsidiaries such as Quaker 
Maid would still have a market f or their output. The per-
sonnel of the various purchasing departments could be taken 
over by the various subsidiaries so that none of the contacts 
would be lost . There is nothing in the complaint which 
prohibits this action just as long as the buying departments 
themselves are notused. The manufacturing subsidiaries would 
have to set up a staff of salesmen to contact the various 
independent di visions and also to contact competitors . 
Produce purchasing would erhaps present a problem 
for a whi1e , but then again, the various divisions could 
f ollow the lead of the manufacturing subsidiaries and take 
over Acco personnel and buyers f'rom the field offices . 
'rhe only big problem would be that of adjustments 
in prices because of a change in costs. I t has been claimed 
lll 
in rp IS neWSpaper advertising that priC eS in the ~p StoreS 
would be higher . But t hfs is doubtful. Once the adjustment 
has been made , there is no r eason why the various divisions 
could not operate so as to charge approximately the same 
prices they have now. It is true that their pur chasing costs 
might be a l ittle higher and that to s tay in business, they 
might have to raise retail prices for a time to gi ve them an 
adequate oper ating margin, but this situation should only be 
tempo rary if' i t exi sts at all . Other chains of the same size 
and even smaller than the divisions have successful! com eted 
on a rice basis . There is no reason why the new chains 
cannot do the same thing, : since they have the benefit of 
experience and a strong organization all ready to go . 
There are two intangi le factors which might be lost 
for a time and that will need building up . The first is the 
loss of the tremendous ba rgaining ower , and the second is 
loss of· ood will . Loss of bargaining power might result 
from deer ase in size , but the real contributing factor would 
probably be loss of aggressiveness on the part of the indiv-
idual management of a division. There is still lenty of 
competition among suppliers and they are not going to start 
raising prices just because one big buyer has become seven 
buyers who are still large . If the various divisions are 
aggr essive and continue to purchase efficiently, then they 
could still kee prices down . Food is not in short su pl 
l 2 
in this country so that they will not be competing with each 
other. 
This leaves loss of good will as the final problem. 
The various chains could probably retain some part of the A&P 
nrune just as the various divisions of Standard Oil did when 
they were separated in 1912 . There should be no reason for 
any change in the MP brand names that are attched to the 
various produc t s . Probably most customers would not notice 
the change at all and continue buying at a store that is j ust 
about the same as it was before the dissolution. This is 
a problem that is up to the individual divisions to solve. 
If management is efficient and ~gressive , then the stores 
could carry on normally and within a short time , the consumer 
would forget the breakup of the national organization. But if 
any of the divisions should attempt to materially change its 
name or brands ~ or : appearance right away, then there might be 
some difficulty in rebuilding the good will of the customer. 
Any changes should be made gradually over a long period of 
time and no new changes attempted until a previous one has been 
accepted . 
Effect on Supplie~~ 
The suppliers who have been providing A&P with 
manufactured food products ?dll probably notice very little 
change in their relationships with the various divisions . 
They will be contacted by seven buyers instead of one , but 
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the suppliers will still be shipping to · the s~ne warehouses 
in the same quantities. It may be possible that the divisions 
will not be able to command as great a discount since the 
separate units b-!Jy smaller individual quanti ties, but the 
new chains should be able to get the same price as their com-
petitors , and therefore be able to compete . 
There is one factor which m~hf affect the suppliers. 
The giant manufacturing subsidiaries will be able to sell to 
all of the trade once they are made independent operators. 
This would me an new competition in the f~eld and the old 
independent suppliers would have an incr~asing~ tough time . 
I 
I t is probable that the subsidiaries would add new lines and 
set up a sales force that could threaten many smaller companies, 
since many of the P.&.P subsidiaries rate among the largest in 
the country.. The plants would have a fairly assured market 
among the former A&P stores ~~d anything over and above this 
volume would serve to increase the profi ts of the subsidiari es. 
The suppliers of fruit and produce would also have 
seven buyers contacting them instead of one. There may be 
some shift in the method of buying and·the quantities purchased , 
but the change should not be too great. The individual chains 
would probably concentrate more on carload lots and not have 
quite as complete a coverage of the countr,y as the old A&P did. 
I t would also be possible for them to contact smaller suppliers 
since the quantities needed would not be as large for each 
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individual chain . 
On the whole, the suppliers would probably not be 
greatly disturbed. The market would still be there but just 
in another form . "In general, they would still be dealing 
with the same people, but have seven accounts instead of one 
or be supplying a new independent manufacturing fi rm in the 
place of an A&P subs i diary. The divisions would still be 
large enough to have plenty of buying power and , as was 
mentioned above , competition among the new buyers would be 
slight. 
The Effect on Competition 
Competition-at the retail level is never easy . 
Whether it is fair or not makes no difference , and some 
retailers are bound to get hurt. Many small stores fail to 
take advantage of the opportunities available to them to 
improve their operations and that lack of capital and oor 
management account 'for most of the failures has been shown 
in most of the failures of small retail stores . They will 
still continue to fail even after A&P has been broken up . 
The chains -wi.ll still ave the advantage of being able to 
offer l ower prices , and they will still be tough competitors . 
Therefore , there will be very little relief f or those who 
think that once A&P goes, everything will be all right. 
There is thi s to consider though : I f A&P has been 
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deliberately cutting prices in pertain areas to gain business· 
f rom competitors and has made these prices so low as to cause 
an unnatural loss, then the punishment administered by the 
court should help to stop this practice. But there are other 
ways of competing that are legal and the new M.P chains could 
still offer tough competition . The status quo would be changed 
very little. It is true that there might be a more equal 
opportunity to obtain the same proportionate prices on 
mer chandise from suppliers, but, there are others in the field 
who are also receiving discriminatoFy allowances and who 
would not be required to stop until they were caught and 
prosecuted. Punishing one will not have an effect on all 
even after a precedent has been set up . There should be other 
ways of stopping this preferential treatment such as check-
ing on the suppliers as well as the large chains to see that 
they clearly understand and carry out cease and desist orders . 
Competition will probably continue on its way 
undist urbed at the retail level, and the same will probably 
hold true for brokers and wholesalers. The divisions are still 
going to perform the same wholesaling functions they did 
previously. None of the separate chains are going to be any 
more inclined to patronize wholesalers , but it may be that 
the chains will have to re sort to brokers more than they did 
in the past , since their buying organizations will not be as 
extensive. If the case is won by the government, it might 
also mean t hat many of the suppliers,who have been only 
selling direct,might once again wo r k t hr ough brokers . When 
the new divisional buyers will go into the market to buy 
direct from producers, they will .be paying not only a mill 
net to the supplier, but an additional percentage to take 
care of brokerage that the buyers will be performing for 
themselves . This brokerage will go into t he pockets of the 
suppl~ers a..."1d once again, the _A&P chains will be charged for 
services not perfonned. 
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The government has charged that ~~P is out to reduce 
competition , yet the competitive picture is growing increas-
ingly difficult for .r:.,&_P every day from both the cor:npeting 
chains and the independents . I t is true that .A&P does almost 
three times more business than the next largest chain in the 
country, but unless A&P practiced very strong competitive 
measures , this position could easily go down ~ The government 
claims that while A&P ' s percentage of t he total food sales 
in the country has gone down somewhat, it still remains high 
in the areas in which A&P operates,and that the increase in 
stores and sales could have very easily taken place in other 
sections than those occupied by .A&P. (1) This statement is 
not necessarily true, but the government did point out that 
.A&P is not losing its share of the business and that the units 
( l) U.S. v .Great .A.&P Tea co . , 67 Fed .Supp ~ 626 , p . 637 
are still holding on to a good share of the business in the 
sections in which they operate . Out of thirty-nine units, 
twenty six had a share of the food market in their individual 
areas of between ten and twent percent. ( l) 
Some of the toughest competition is offered b 
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competing chains. The second lar~:e st chain in sale s volume, 
Safeway , does not operate in the same area as A&P although 
they overlap in a few places such as Texas and the Los Angeles 
area. Safeway occupies most of the west while A&P is largely 
i n the east . I n a recent survey made by This week Magazine, 
it was shown that in 1946, seventy-five counties did 50% of 
all the retail food store sales in the country . These are 
big city counties and -~P ha s stores in all of them. ( 2) 
Furthermore, with the exception of Safeway , nearly all the 
top chains in the country concentrate in the eastern area 
particularly around the s~ne big city market s that A&P 
occupies . Exce t for California and Seattle,washington, there 
is only one big retail chain in the west . With most of the 
nation ' s potential in the east, it would be the logical place 
f'or expansion . 
Some of the top competitor s are Kroger in Cincinnati 
which has the third largest sales vol ume in the country , and 
( l) U •• v .Great ~~P Tea Co.,67 Fed.Supp.626,p . 637 
(2) "Report on Grocery Distribution" ,This Week M~azine,1947 
First National in New England which does 12 . 8% of the food 
store sales in that area. Stop and Shop of Boston has in-
creased its sales over nine times what they were ten years 
ago. National Tea of Chicago covers the upper western Great 
Lakes region in competition with A&P and does about 9% of 
the business in the area. Grand Union of New York City has 
also increased its sales to over ten times what they were 
ten years ago in one of the most competitive sections of the 
countr.y . American of Philadelphia gets a larger share of bus-
iness in t hat area than any other chain, while Colonial of 
Atlanta has sales of eight times what they were ten years 
. ago . These competing chains are all operat i ng in A&P' s · 
s-c.rongest areas and in general are expanding their sales at 
a faster rate than A&P which has increased its sales vol~~e 
only three times in the last t en year s . (1) 
The independents have also been increasing their 
share of the business . I n 1933, the chains had 44.1% of the 
retail store business while the independents had only 55.9%. 
I n a steady trend upward, the independents increased their 
per centage to 61% in 1941. (2) The sales percentages during 
t he war years would not be conclusive, but by 1948 , the 
independents still had 61% of the business and the chains 
only 39%. (3) It is not conclusive as to what parts of the 
( 1) "Report on Grocery Distribution", Thi_§_!eek Magazine ,1949 
(2) 11 Independent s Gain At Chain Store Expense",Busine§_§ Week, 
June 12,1943,p.88 ( 3) "Report on Grocery Distribution" , This week Magazine ,1949 
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country received the g r eatest expansion in independent retail 
sales, but with a growing western population, a part of the 
expansion may have taken lace outside of the A&P operating 
area. However, the greater potential is still in the big 
cities of the east. 
I n conclusion, then, A&P has been meeting increasing 
competition over a period of the last twent y years, and rather 
than driving it out , it seems to be gaining . This means that 
in the competitive battle, A&P must use every means at its 
disposal to keep up the fight. On the whole, competition 
has been stimulated rather than suppressed .. Barring artif-
icial factors injected by the government, prices have been 
kept low, and the consumer has benefitted. 
Dangers of a Precedent 
If the government wi.Tls its case against M.P, there 
is the possibility that a precedent might be established that 
will allow the Antitrust Division to procede against other 
large chains. At the time of the trial in I llinois, under 
J·udge Lindley, Safeway and Kroger were also accused of 
r es training trade and engaging in monopolistic practices . 
Rather than go to court as A&P did, they entered into consent 
decrees and paid fines. If a precedent is set, the Department 
of J·ustice could then precede against t hese next two largest 
chains and break them up . Variety chains such as ~oolworth ' s 
are also being attacked as well as such businesses as Sears 
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and Roebuck. The likelihood of such action is not at all 
remote considering the atti tude of the government. There 
is little doubt but what the courts could f ind evidence of 
illegal action on the part of these large chains, but these 
actions would be more apt to be interpreted as monopolistic 
practices, and findings of monopoly and restraint of trade 
would be arrived at more easily when following the A&P case 
pre cedent. · The cour ts would be apt to confUse the issue of 
size and power much more easily and the line at which a chain 
becomes a monopoly would be a di f ficult one to avoid. In 
v i ew of the vagueness of t e Anti trust Laws and the changing 
i nterpretations of these laws by a politically packed court, 
a large chain would have to watch its ste-J very closely. 
There is even the possibility that some might raise their 
prices just to avoid gove~~ent prosecution. 
It might be argued on the other hand that these 
chains have violated the law and should be unished . ut 
does the punishment fit the crime? I f the charges are less 
serious than those against -~P, then the a.TlS'IJ'er is definate~y 
no . There is considerable doubt as to whet _er PRP hould 
be broken up and to do it to a firm that has not viol ted 
the law as seriously as A&P ould probably me n that, after 
all, t he governm nt ' s true motive for breaking up the lar e 
chains is to cut do~n their size and destroy bigness . 
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.:ffect on the Consumer 
I t is doubtful whether the consumer would notice 
any change in her daily marketing habits if the P..&P w .s 
broken up into seven chains . I f she has been used to buying 
at the A&P, she will still :find a store quite similar to 
the one she was :fami liar with. I n s ite o:f P&P ' s rotests 
that everything \rould be different and that many stores will 
have t o close , the retail outlets would keep right on o er-
ating. The main reason for this is that A&P ha s been reducing 
the number of its stores, eliminating the poor contributors 
and setti · u supermarkets in the most ideal locations. 
I n most cases , the store is at a locat i on where t ere is an 
excel lent market potential and probabl where any o erator 
with enough capital and 1nanagerial abil it could make a go 
of' it . 
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Price ha s been the main issue as far a s the consumer 
is concerned . A&P, in its l arge store esters , has stated 
that prices will be higher if fl.JS:P is put out of business . 
They reason that without the sup ort of a large inte rated 
operation, the retail stores would have to charge higher 
prices to make any sort of profit. r.hat they overlook is that 
small chains and independent supermarkets are able to 
compete with A&P right now without the benefit of a l a rge 
integrated backing .. J . Howard. McGr~th ,At torney General , 
believes that it will r esult in lower prices for over 90% 
of the public who, because of A&P ' s practices , are required 
to purchase their supplies at highe r prices . (1) This is 
a hi hly i mprobable situation . Every producer is out to 
make mone ; profits are of primary interest . I t is do btful 
that a supplier is going to lower hi s prices to everyone 
once the pressure of A&P ' s great bargaining power has been 
relaxed. The supplier will do everythiP~ he can to maintain 
his present level of prices and he will charge as much as he 
can reasonably get. Therefore , prices will probably not be 
affected to any extent a~ the consumer can continue purch-
asing as many groceries for the same amount of money as she 
did previously. 
The re i s one exce tion to this . Retail store 
prices will probably not rise because there is so much 
competition at this level . But suppose that after the case 
was won by the government , it decided to ro secute other 
s i milar chains on the basis of precedent . I t would throw 
a scare into the large retai l stores and chains that are 
c arging the lower prices . To head off any government action, 
i t is conceivable that the chains would raise prices and in-
crease their gross margin . The independents would not be far 
behind, for it is to their advantage to char.' e as much as 
they can get . I f their cor..neti tion sl ackens up on pri ce , 
( l )J .Howard JicGrath, "Bigness I tself' No Crime" ,u. s . News , 
Nov . 25,1949,p . 29 
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the independents would welcome the change for the higher 
levels. The government is opposed to any chain that lowers 
its prices and gross margin i n the hope of getting increased 
vol ume and cash profits and decreased expense percentqges. 
I t has stated in the present charges against A&P that the 
chain has an unfair advantage when it operates below the 
cost of doing business . (1 ) This boils down to the fact 
that the government would like to see a cost-plus philos-
ophy followed. I n a competitve market, it is almost imposs-
ible to set retail prices by addj"ng a certain percentage on 
to the cost of an article to arr ive at a retail price . 
Competition must be taken into account ; consumer preferences 
must be consi dered. I t would make it difficult for the 
big retailer if he were forced to put a certain markup over 
cost on all his stock . I tems that he wants to move have to 
be put at a lower price many times in order to get rid of 
them. I t is one of the ways used by retailers to draw cust-
omers to their stores. In fact , it is one of the major 
f actors in con~etition . Price competition is keen and usually 
benefits the consumer. 
It is almost impossi ble to tell whether the Antitrust 
Division will continue to prosecute other chains , but there 
i s certainly some likelihood of it. The way would be open to 
\ l )U. S. v.Great A&P Tea Co . , N.Y. District Ct .,Civil Action 
No . 52-139,p . l6 
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a political administration that is definately opposed to 
concentrations of big business. If the government did 
continue, it would mean the punishir€ of big business to 
protect the smaller operator who is not as efficient. The 
consumer would be hurt by a r i sing price level . 
Some Considerat ions Against Breaking Up. A&P 
The neglected individual throughout the entire case 
seems to be the consumer. I n a recent public opinion poll 
conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion, 66% 
of the people questioned had heard of the case~ Only 24% 
of these agreed with the government while 46% agreed with A&P 
and 30% had no opinion. (1) The consumer has become used to 
low prices and large clean stores and may not want to see 
them changed. M P has been among the leaders in price red-
uctions ever since its_ economy stores were started in 1913. 
I t has been pointed out above that although the consumer will 
probably not notice any particular change, should the govern-
ment win, she might find higher prices in the food stores if 
the Antitrust Division continues to prosecute other stores . 
One b~ chain broken into several parts would not be enough 
to affect t he econo~, but if several of them were divided up 
and forced to return to wholesalers and brokers as sources of 
supply, there would defina.tely be an effect on pr ices. 
( 1) "The Case For .A&P" , Magazine Digest, l\i1arch , l950 
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Just who does benefit from an outcome favorable 
to the government? Retailers would not find the situation 
changed much and competition would still be as strong . 
Suppli ers will not start quoting l ower prices, ~ and ve1~ 
likely the wholesalers will not have any increase of busi-
ness. But , it ·will be a step forvvard for them ia the 
preservation of their methods of operation which are slowly 
being driven out by more modern and efficient ways of 
conducting food marketi ng. It will make a large chain t hink 
twice before it cuts prices , even when legal, in an attempt 
to incr ease volume. I t ·will also cause these same large 
chains t o hesitate when they can pass on legal price savings 
that are not taken by the independents , to the consumer. 
Whom should the government be tryiP.g to protect 
when it does break up A&P? The answer would logically be 
the consumer, but at present, the consumer is enjoying low 
rices and good merchandise not only from the A&P stores , 
but from their competitors . I t would seem that the 
government is trying to protect a group of wholesalers , 
brokers, and independent retailers who have been lobbying 
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for years to have the large chains restricted so that they 
can retard progress in retailing and perpetuate a food 
marketing system that leads to h~her prices. The Justice 
Department would retaliate by sqying that if these com-
petitors of the chains are not protected, then it is possible 
that the gro~~h of the chains might doom the independent 
to ultimate extinction and thus make it possible for the 
big companies that sur-vive to raise prices and exploit 
their advantage . But, once the chains do start to raise 
prices, and ·recei ve more than a normal return,com etition 
will come back because the field has become profitable 
again. The only way that this competitive factor can be 
completely eliminated would be ~hrough government restrict-
ions and control which would make competition impossible. 
One other factor which should be considered is 
the matter of parity price supports used by the government 
to bolster up the farmers ' income . The farm l obby in 
Washington wants the farmers to receive as much as they can 
for their produce. Vithout this government support, big 
buyers sue as .~P would be able to force the price of 
reduce do~1 as low as possible. As it is , the large chains 
are doing much to keep the prices do¥Yn through reduced hand-
ling costs and competitive pricing. I f the government 
continues with its program of prosecuting the large food 
c ains, the buying pressure exerted by these large scale 
purchasers will be relieved and possibly leave the way open 
for more control over produce prices by the farmer . 
I s A&P a I~nopoly? 
There are two major charges against A&P which, 
in effect, cover all the various illegal acts that A&P has 
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been accused of coiT~itting. Since the court is interes ted 
in the over-all effect of the chain ' s actions rather than 
individual isolated incidents, these two charges will sum-
marize the major areas o:f alleged restraints of trade and 
monopoly. First, A&P is accused of receiving price concess-
ions and allowances that were discriminatory in nature and 
w re allegedly forced from the suppliers. These included 
purchases made by both the large buying departments for 
food products and by Acco when it performed illegal broker-
age acts. The evidence leaves little doubt as to whether 
A&P is guilty or not. The company definately did receive 
the discriminatory allowances , but as was discussed in the 
chapter on Buying, the government has over- exagerated the 
importance of the preferences and the manner in which they 
were obtained. 
The second major charge is that A&.P operated at 
a loss in selected areas with the express purpose of driving 
out competition. It was aided in this program through the 
use of illegally received profits from discriminatory prices . 
Again, it must be admitted that there is some evidence of 
guilt, but far less than in connection with the first charge. 
Below cost selling has become an accepted business practice 
among not only the large retail chains, but other businesses 
as well,to gain volume. Competition has been increasing 
rather than decreasing, and at no time did the courts show 
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that .~P ever gained control of any market and raised their 
prices higher than the level normally charged in the area . 
The court had said that the government has not 
of fered evi dence of any expressed undertaking to restrain 
interstate trade or crea t a monopoly . (1 ) The court adds 
that it is t e goverrunent ' s position that it has roved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that all of the actions by A&P, disclosed 
by the evidence , in the end amount inevitably to illegal 
restraint of' t rade and an attempt to create a partial monopoly. 
1ne government i nsists that the policies and prac t ice s of 
A&P have remained constant f r om the year 1925. I n another 
statement, the courts said that despite the claim of high 
character of t he general business and economic policy of 
A&P, they could not escape the conviction t hat , by their 
cooperation in t he promotion of the plan of operation which 
involved illegal action and illegal restraint of trade , they 
rendered themselves subject to the penalty of the law . 
Congress did not condone good trusts and condemn bad ones; 
it forbade all . I t is no excuse for unreasonable restraint 
or monopoly that such interference with free competition has 
not been utilized to extr act f rom the consumers more than a 
fair prof it . (2) 
But, J uqge Lindley erred when he said that Congress 
( l )U. S. v.Great A&.P Tea Co . , 67 Fed . Supp.626,p . 632 
(2)Ibi d. ,p.679 
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did not condone good trusts and condemn bad ones; it forbade 
all. The Supreme Court ruled in the Standard Oil Case of 
1911 that the Rule of Reason must be applied and that the 
Sherma~ Antitrust Act applied not to monopolies as such, 
but to those who used their power for unreasonable restraints 
of trade. Thurman Arnold said that applying the Rule of 
Reason .to present day business organizations de ended on the 
answer to one question: Do they increase the effi ciency of 
production or distribution and pass the savings on to the 
cons~~er? ( 1) A&P does pass its savings on to the consumer. 
Furthermore, the eff i ciency of the company ' s distribution 
prof'ess is far greater than t he efficiency of a mass of 
small , poorly managed, i ndependent retai ler s. 
Should A&P be broken up because it has engaged in 
illegal practices? The answer is no~ The chain has broken 
t he law; there is no doubt of that. But there can be some 
doubt as to w ether these infractions amounted to any great 
unreasonable restraint of trade . The company should be 
punished in some form for having coniDritted the illegal 
acts, but the punishment demanded by the Justice Depart-ment 
is far too drastic t o suit the crime. The court must work 
on the assumption that a collection of i l l egal acts constitutes 
a monopoly. But do the acts comrnitted by A&P mean monopoly 
(1 Thurman Arnold, "Bottlenecks in Business" , (New York, Reynal 
and Hitchcock, l940) p. l 25 
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and a crippling of competition, or do the facts more correctly 
point to increasing competition even in the areas in which 
A&P oper ates? The trend is towards large scale retailing 
operations . Even the independents recognize it and are 
banding to ether in coo erative and volunta_T·y chains. 
The i. onopoly boundry does not seem to have been 
overstepped because A&P has no real control over the food 
market, or even partial control . A&P ' s size is not the 
determining factor a.nd the company does not gain its advant-
ages through bigness . The major advantage comes from util~ 
izing all the factors of efficiency that are available . 
The illegal operations contribute too small a art of t he 
operations of the company to cause it to be dissolved as a 
punishment. The court has tried to show that only a small 
percentage of the profits come from the retailing operations 
as such, but they failed to recognize that the majorit of 
the profits ca'lle from legal integrated operations and that 
t he cash was derived primarily from the final sale of the 
merchandise to the consumer. 
'fuen the present case comes up for trial, the cour t 
must determine how many of the illegal practices are still 
being conti nued by A&P after the past series of decisions . 
I f A&~ has ceased to obtain ill egal advantages, then the 
court would not be justified in condemning the chain as a 
hopeless monopoly to be stopped only by the most drastic 
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of measures . The Antitrust Division has asked for a penalty 
that is not just and wise , and the Court for the Southern 
District of New York should rule in favor of A&P. 
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